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1. Introduction 
It is common  for macroeconomics  to be portrayed as a field in intellectual 
disarray, with  major and  persistent  disagreements  about methodology 
and substance  between  competing  camps of researchers. One frequently 
discussed  measure  of disarray is the distance between  the flexible price 
models  of  the  new  classical  macroeconomics  and  real-business-cycle 
(RBC) analysis,  in which  monetary  policy is essentially  unimportant  for 
real activity, and the sticky-price models  of the New  Keynesian  econom- 
ics, in which  monetary policy is viewed  as central to the evolution  of real 
activity.  For policymakers  and  the  economists  that  advise  them,  this 
perceived  intellectual  disarray makes  it difficult  to employ  recent  and 
ongoing  developments  in macroeconomics. 
The intellectual  currents of the last ten years are, however,  subject to a 
very  different  interpretation:  macroeconomics  is moving  toward  a New 
Neoclassical  Synthesis. In the 1960s, the original synthesis  involved  a com- 
mitment  to  three-sometimes  conflicting-principles:  a desire  to pro- 
vide practical macroeconomic  policy advice,  a belief that short-run price 
stickiness  was at the root of economic fluctuations,  and a commitment  to 
modeling  macroeconomic  behavior  using  the  same  optimization  ap- 
proach commonly  employed  in microeconomics. 
This paper benefited from presentations  at the Bank of England  and the workshop on 
"Monetary  Policy,  Price Stability,  and the Structure  of Goods and Labor  Markets"  spon- 
sored  by the Bank  of Italy,  Centro  Paolo  Baffi,  and IGIER.  The  authors  acknowledge  helpful 
comments from B. Bernanke,  O. Blanchard,  C. Goodhart,  M. Dotsey, B. Hetzel, B. Mc- 
Callum, E. McGrattan,  E. Nelson, J. Rotemberg,  K. West, and A. Wolman.  The opinions 
are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal 
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The New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  inherits the spirit of the old, in that it 
combines  Keynesian  and classical elements.  Methodologically,  the new 
synthesis  involves  the systematic  application of intertemporal optimiza- 
tion and rational expectations  as stressed by Robert Lucas. In the synthe- 
sis,  these  ideas  are applied  to  the  pricing and  output  decisions  at the 
heart of Keynesian  models,  new  and old, as well as to the consumption, 
investment,  and factor supply  decisions  that are at the heart of classical 
and  RBC models.  Moreover,  the  new  synthesis  also  embodies  the  in- 
sights of monetarists,  such as Milton Friedman and Karl Brunner, regard- 
ing the theory and practice of monetary  policy. 
Thus,  there are new  dynamic  microeconomic  foundations  for macro- 
economics.  These  common  methodological  ideas  are implemented  in 
models  that range from the flexible,  small models  of academic research 
to  the  new  rational-expectations  policy  model  of  the  Federal Reserve 
Board.  The New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  (NNS)  suggests  a set of major 
conclusions  about  the  role of monetary  policy. First, NNS  models  sug- 
gest  that monetary  policy  actions  can have  an important  effect on real 
economic  activity, persisting  over  several years,  due  to gradual adjust- 
ment  of individual  prices  and  the  general  price level.  Second,  even  in 
settings  with  costly price adjustment,  the models  suggest  little long-run 
trade-off between  inflation  and real activity. Third, the models  suggest 
significant  gains  from eliminating  inflation,  which  stem from increased 
transactions efficiency and reduced relative price distortions.  Fourth, the 
models  imply  that credibility plays  an important role in understanding 
the effects  of monetary  policy. These  four ideas  are consistent  with  the 
public statements  of central bankers from a wide  range of countries. 
In addition  to the  general  points,  NNS  models  allow  the analysis  of 
alternative  monetary  policy  rules within  a rational-expectations  setting. 
It is in this role that they can inform-rather  than confirm-the  priors of 
central bankers.  The credibility of monetary policy appears intuitively  to 
require a simple  and transparent rule. But which  one? We use the NNS 
approach  to develop  a set of principles  and practical guidelines  for neu- 
tral monetary  policy, defined  as that which  supports  output at its poten- 
tial level in an environment  of stable prices. The new  synthesis  suggests 
that such  a monetary  policy  involves  stabilizing the average markup of 
price over marginal cost.  In turn, this implies  a monetary policy regime 
of inflation  targets,  which  vary relatively little through  time.  Although 
price stability has been long  suggested  as a primary objective for mone- 
tary policy, a number of major questions  have arisen about its desirabil- 
ity in practice. We confront a range of implementation  issues,  including 
the  response  to  commodity  price  shocks,  the  long  and  variable  lags 
between  monetary  policy and the price level,  the potential policy trade- The  New Neoclassical  Synthesis *  233 
off between  price  and  output  variability, and  the  use  of  a  short-term 
interest rate as the policy instrument. 
The  organization  of  our  discussion  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we 
describe the general approach of the original neoclassical  synthesis  as it 
was  articulated  by  Paul Samuelson.  In Section  3,  we  review  why  the 
original neoclassical  synthesis  was  never fully accepted by monetarists, 
even  at  the  height  of  its  influence  in  the  1960s,  and  then  was  more 
fundamentally  challenged  by  the  rational-expectations  revolution.  We 
then turn to more recent work in macroeconomics  covering RBC models 
in Section 4, and New  Keynesian  economics  in Section 5. 
The  NNS  is  introduced  and  described  in Section  6.  We analyze  the 
effect  of monetary  policy  within  the  new  synthesis  using  two  comple- 
mentary  approaches.  First, we  employ  the standard Keynesian  method 
that views  monetary  policy as affecting real aggregate demand.  Second, 
we  use  an RBC-style alternative which  views  variations in the average 
markup  as  a  source  of  variations  in  aggregate  supply;  these  markup 
variations are analogous  to the effects of tax shocks in RBC models.  We 
use the insights  of the previous  sections  to develop  principles for mone- 
tary policy  in Section  7 and practical guidelines  for monetary  policy  in 
Section 8. Section 9 is a summary and conclusion. 
2.  The  Neoclassical  Synthesis 
As popularized  by Paul Samuelson,1  the neoclassical  synthesis  was  ad- 
vertised  as an engine  of analysis  which  offered a Keynesian  view  of the 
determination  of national income-business  cycles arising from changes 
in aggregate demand because of wage and price stickiness-and  neoclas- 
sical principles to guide microeconomic  analysis. In our discussion  of the 
neoclassical  synthesis,  we consider  three major issues:  the nature of the 
monetary  transmission  mechanism,  the interaction of inflation and real 
activity, and the role of monetary policy. 
2.1 THE  MONETARY  TRANSMISSION  MECHANISM 
The basic macroeconomic  framework  of the neoclassical  synthesis  was 
the  IS-LM model.  The  neoclassical  synthesis  generated  a  number  of 
advances  in the 1950s and 1960s to make this framework more consistent 
with  individual  choice  and  to  incorporate  the  dynamic  elements  that 
were  so  evidently  necessary  for  econometric  modeling  of  macroeco- 
nomic time series.  Theoretical work rationalized the demand  for money 
1. An early description  of the neoclassical  synthesis  is found  in the 1955 edition  of Samu- 
elson's  Economics,  and the mature synthesis  is discussed  in the 1967 edition (Samuelson, 
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as  arising  from  individual  choice  at  the  margin,  leading  to  a  micro- 
economic  explanation  of the interest rate and scale variables in the mone- 
tary sector. The synthesis  stimulated advances in the theory of consump- 
tion and investment  based  on individual  choice over time.  Econometric 
work  on  money  demand  and  investment  developed  dynamic  partial 
adjustment  specifications. 
These  new  elements  were  introduced  into  large-scale  models  of the 
macroeconomy.  Our discussion  focuses  on the Federal Reserve System's 
MPS model,  which  was developed  because  "no existing model has as its 
major purpose  the  quantification  of monetary  policy  and its effects  on 
the  economy,"  as  de  Leeuw  and  Gramlich (1968, p.  11) reported.  The 
MPS model initially included  the core elements  of the IS-LM framework: 
a financial  block,  an  investment  block,  and  a consumption-inventory 
block. The structure of production  possibilities  and the nature of wage- 
price  dynamics  were  viewed  as important,  but  secondary  in the  early 
stage of model  development.  Relative to other then-existing  models,  the 
MPS model  suggested  larger effects of monetary policy because  it incor- 
porated a significant effect of long-term interest rates on investment  and 
its estimated lags in the demand for money suggested  much faster adjust- 
ment than in earlier models. 
In its fully  developed  form,  circa 1972, the MPS model  incorporated 
several  structural features  that are worth  stressing.  It was  designed  to 
have  long-run  properties  like  that  of  the  consensus  growth  model  of 
Robert Solow, including the specification of an aggregate production func- 
tion  implying  a constant  labor share  of national  income  in the  face of 
trend  productivity  growth.  As  explained  in Ando  (1974), however,  the 
MPS model  had a short-run production  function which linked output  to 
labor input roughly  one for one,  as a result of variations in the utilization 
of capital. The empirical motivation for this feature is displayed  in Figure 
1: over the course of business  cycles, total man-hours and output display 
similar  amplitude,  with  measured  capacity  utilization  strongly  pro- 
cyclical.  For the  most  part, these  cyclical variations in total hours  arise 
largely  from  variations  in  employment  rather than  average  hours  per 
worker.2 
2.2 INFLATION  AND REAL  ACTIVITY 
In the early years of the neoclassical synthesis,  macroeconometric models 
were constructed  and practical policy analysis was undertaken assuming 
that nominal  wages  and prices evolved  independently  from real activity 
2. In each panel of Figure 1, output  is the lighter solid line. The data are filtered to isolate 
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Figure 1 HOURS,  EMPLOYMENT,  AND  UTILIZATION 
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and its determinants.  In fact, in the 1950s, there was relatively little vari- 
ability in  inflation.  By the  mid-1960s  this  premise  could  no  longer  be 
maintained-inflation  became  a serious policy concern and it was plain 
to see that inflation was related to developments  in the economy.3 
The Phillips curve thus became a central part of macroeconomic model- 
ing and policy  analysis.  Macroeconomic  models  were closed  with wage 
and  price  sectors  that  indicated  major trade-offs  between  the  rate of 
inflation and the level  of real activity. The MPS model  specified  that the 
price level was determined  by a markup of price over marginal cost, with 
the nominal  wage  rate being  a central determinant  of cost.  In addition, 
the MPS model made the markup depend  on the extent of utilization and 
allowed  the price level  to gradually adjust toward marginal cost (Ando, 
1974, pp.  544, 552). The MPS version  of the Phillips curve also specified 
that the rate of wage  inflation depended  on the unemployment  rate and 
the lagged  rate of change  of nominal  prices.  With these  three assump- 
tions  taken together,  as in de Menil and Enzler (1972), the MPS model 
suggested  that the effect of reducing  the long-run  rate of inflation from 
5% to 0% was  an increase  in the unemployment  rate from 3.5% to 7%. 
The nature of the trade-off between  inflation and unemployment  be- 
came  central  to  macroeconomic  policy,  as  well  as  to  macroeconomic 
modeling.  Policy advisers  worried  about a wage-price  spiral and were 
concerned  that  inflation  could  develop  a  momentum  of  its  own,  as 
appeared  to be the case in the recession  of 1957-58  (Okun et al.,  1969, 
p.  96; Okun,  1970, p.  8). By the standards  of later years,  the outcomes 
for inflation  and unemployment  were  favorable in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Phillips correlation held up remarkably well throughout  the 1960s.4 
Yet economic  advisors  operating  within  the  synthesis  tradition  were 
pessimistic  about the prospects  for taming inflation. 
2.3 THE  ROLE  OF MONETARY  POLICY 
The  practitioners  of  the  neoclassical  synthesis  saw  a need  for activist 
aggregate  demand  management.  Given  the  degree  of short-run  price- 
level stickiness built into the neoclassical synthesis,  monetary policy was 
3. de Menil and Enzler  (1972)  report  "the first  large econometric  models of the 1940s  and 
1950s  had relatively  little to do with wages and prices. As late as 1960,  one of the major 
U.S. models did not have wage or price equations. In the late 1950s, the authors of 
another  model reported  that for all practical  purposes  price  and wage movements  were 
independent of real  variables  in their  model. However,  postwar  experience  has focused 
attention more and more on the problem of inflation and has shown that there are 
crucial  links between real variables  and prices  and wages that imply a tradeoff  between 
real output and employment  on the one hand and inflation  on the other." 
4. See Tobin's  (1972,  p. 48) discussion of the cruel  dilemma. The  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  *  237 
recognized  to have  potentially  powerful  effects.  Yet, in practice, policy 
advisors  working  within  the synthesis  viewed  monetary  policy as play- 
ing  a permissive  role in  supporting  fiscal policy  initiatives.  Moreover, 
economists  regarded the effect of market rates on interest-sensitive  com- 
ponents  of aggregate  demand  as less important than direct credit effects 
(Okun  et al.,  1969, pp.  85-92).  They thought  monetary  policy  worked 
primarily by  affecting  the  availability  of  financial  intermediary  credit, 
with  particular importance  attached  to  the  effect  on  spreads  between 
market rates and then-regulated  deposit  rates. Accordingly, there was a 
reluctance to let the burden  of stabilization policy fall on monetary  pol- 
icy, since it worked  by a distortion of sorts.5 
In spite of a reluctance to use it, practitioners of the neoclassical synthe- 
sis recognized  that monetary policy could control inflation. Okun's (1970, 
p. 8) view was representative:  "the basic cure for inflation is to remove or 
offset its cause: cut aggregate demand by fiscal or monetary policy suffi- 
ciently so that money  spending  will no longer exceed the value of goods." 
James Tobin could say of the 1966 tightening  of monetary policy to fight 
sharply rising inflation that "the burden of restraint fell almost wholly  on 
the Fed which  acted vigorously  and courageously."6 
Thus,  monetary  policy in the neoclassical  synthesis  was regarded as a 
powerful  instrument,  but  one  ill  suited  to  controlling  inflation  or  to 
undertaking  stabilization  policy.  While  monetary  policy  could  control 
inflation in theory, the practical view  was that inflation was mainly gov- 
erned by psychological  factors and momentum,  so that monetary policy 
could have only a very gradual effect. Since monetary policy created dis- 
tortions across sectors,  fiscal policy was better suited for controlling the 
business  cycle. 
3. Monetarism  and  Rational  Expectations 
When it emerged  in the 1960s, monetarism  seemed  to threaten the neo- 
classical synthesis.  Partly, this was because monetarists portrayed them- 
selves  as intellectual  descendants  of the pre-Keynesian  quantity theory 
of money,  as articulated by Irving Fisher and others.  Partly, it was  be- 
cause  monetarists  questioned  so much  of synthesis  doctrine,  e.g.,  the 
effectiveness  of  fiscal policy  and  the  structural stability of the  Phillips 
curve.  In  the  1970s  and  1980s,  many  monetarist  insights  were  to  be 
5. One particular  concern was that changing credit availability  would create instability 
in those sectors most dependent on financial intermediaries:  small businesses and 
individuals. 
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incorporated into the broad-based synthesis,  and for good reason: mone- 
tarism was  a set of principles  for practical policy advice,  it was commit- 
ted to neoclassical  reasoning,  and it too identified  the source of business 
cycles  in  short-run  price-level  stickiness.7  However,  at the  same  time, 
Lucas's  critique of macroeconometric  policy  and  the  subsequent  intro- 
duction  of  rational expectations  into  macroeconomics  led  to a broader 
questioning  of the neoclassical  synthesis. 
The quantity theory-the  heart of monetarism-suggested  organizing 
monetary  analysis  in  terms  of  the  supply  of  nominal  money  and  the 
demand  for real money  balances.  This  focus  had  implications  for the 
monetary  transmission  mechanism,  for  the  linkage  between  inflation 
and real activity, and for the role of monetary policy. 
3.1 THE  MONETARY  TRANSMISSION  MECHANISM 
The basic monetarist  framework  was  the quantity  equation,  which  we 
introduce  using  notation  that we carry throughout  the paper. According 
to the quantity  theory, nominal  income  (Yt) is the result of the stock of 
money  (Mt) and its velocity  (vt): 
log Y, = log M, + log vt.  (3.1) 
Monetarists  made  the  quantity  theory  operational  by taking money  as 
autonomous.8  Monetarists  also  constructed  an  econometric  model  on 
the basis of their analytical framework. The St. Louis model of Anderson 
and Jordan (1968) was  simply  the quantity equation in a distributed-lag 
context,  with  a flexible specification  introduced  to capture the dynamic 
adjustment  of money  demand  and money  supply. 
The monetarist  view  of the  transmission  mechanism  was  sharply  at 
odds  with  the  neoclassical  synthesis,  which  tended  to view  the  main 
channels  of transmission  as working  through credit availability and sec- 
ondly  through  the  effect  of  long-term  interest  rates  on  investment. 
Monetarists regarded both of those channels as secondary. They focused 
on money  rather than credit channels. 
Following  Irving Fisher, monetarists  recognized  that nominal interest 
rates contained  a real component  and a premium for expected  inflation. 
Like other lags, those in expectation formation were taken to be long and 
variable. As a practical matter, though,  monetarists regarded most of the 
7. See,  for instance,  Friedman (1970). 
8. Fully operational  monetarist  analysis also required assumptions  about velocity. In some 
contexts  velocity  was  assumed  constant,  in  others,  autonomous.  More  sophisticated 
analyses  made velocity  a function of a small set of macro variables. The  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  ?  239 
variation  in  long-term  rates as  reflecting  inflation  premia,  giving  long 
rates a relatively  minor  role in the  transmission  of monetary  policy  to 
real activity. 
3.2 INFLATION  AND REAL  ACTIVITY 
Monetarists  also  differed  in their view  of the linkage between  inflation 
and real activity. For the most part, monetarists acknowledged  that they 
had  no  reliable theory  to predict  the  short-run division  of nominal  in- 
come growth  between  the price level (Pt) and real output  (yt)-they  had 
no short-run  price  equation.  In various ways,  they interpreted the apparent 
short-run nonneutrality  of money  as the result of price-level  stickiness. 
But  they  observed  that  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  actions  on  the 
economy  was long and variable. They tended  to attribute that variability 
to differences  in the degree  to which  policy actions were  expected,  be- 
cause  expectations  determined  the  degree  to which  prices  and  wages 
would  adjust to neutralize an injection of money. 
These  expectational  considerations  were  made  explicit by Friedman 
(1968), who  described how  incomplete  adjustment of expectations  could 
lead wages  and prices to respond  sluggishly  to changes in money. At the 
same time, Friedman suggested  that sustained  inflation should not affect 
real activity in the long run, defined  as a situation in which expectations 
were  correct,  since  output  would  then  be  determined  by  real forces.9 
Friedman's suggestions  were well timed. As shown  in Figure 2, inflation 
increased  sharply in the 1970s with little accompanying  expansion  of real 
activity. 10 
3.3 THE  ROLE  OF MONETARY  POLICY 
Monetarists saw a dramatically different role for monetary policy as well. 
Distrustful  of discretionary  and activist monetary policy, they sought  to 
formulate  simple  fixed  rules for policy. With Friedman and  Schwartz's 
(1963) interpretation  of the Great Depression  in mind,  they believed  that 
9. The builders  of the St. Louis  model sought to develop a price  equation  along these lines 
(see Anderson  and Carlson,  1972),  which incorporated  the simultaneous  determination 
of price and output and a long-term  interest rate as a measure  of expected inflation. 
10. Figure  2 displays U.S. inflation  (the dark  line) and unemployment  (the light line), with 
NBER  turning points plotted as vertical  dashed lines. Unemployment  and inflation 
moved inversely during all major  postwar recessions. Business-cycle  components of 
inflation and unemployment are negatively correlated  in a stable manner over the 
postwar  period. However,  low-frequency  trend  components  of inflation  and unemploy- 
ment (cycles with periodicity  greater  than three  years)  bear  relatively  little  relationship 
to each other and virtually  none to NBER  business-cycle  episodes. Not shown, the 
high-frequency  irregular  components of inflation  and unemployment  are also essen- 
tially unrelated, with inflation having much more volatility  at high frequencies  than 
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Figure  2 INFLATION  AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
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the  monetary  authority  should  avoid  major  monetary  shocks  to  the 
macroeconomy,  suggesting  a rule in which  the quantity of money  grew 
at a constant  rate sufficient  to accommodate  trend productivity  growth 
(Friedman 1960). After arguing that sustained  inflation has little effect on 
real activity, Friedman (1969) described a long-run monetary regime that 
involved  sustained  deflation,  making the nominal interest rate zero and 
thereby providing  for an optimal quantity of money. 
In practice, there were also important differences in the suggested  role 
of monetary  policy  over the business  cycle. While the policy advisors  of 
the neoclassical  synthesis  sought  to have  the Federal Reserve maintain 
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interest-rate smoothing  contributed to fluctuations in real economic activ- 
ity by making the money  stock vary procyclically. 
3.4 RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS 
As was  the case with  monetarism,  the introduction  of rational expecta- 
tions into macroeconomics  in the early 1970s at first seemed  incompati- 
ble with  the  neoclassical  synthesis.  This was  particularly ironic in that 
John Muth motivated  his rational-expectations  hypothesis  by suggesting 
that individuals  form expectations  optimally,  which  is a natural exten- 
sion  of  the  neoclassical  principle  that the  economy  is inhabited  by  ra- 
tional, maximizing  agents. 
The early new  classical models,  such  as that of Sargent and Wallace 
(1975), incorporated Friedman's view that perceived variations in money 
led  simply  to  changes  in  prices,  with  only  misperceived  monetary 
changes  having  real effects."  Coupled  with  rational expectations,  this 
strong neutrality mechanism  led to very specific and controversial state- 
ments  about  the  role  of  monetary  policy.  First,  as  in  the  monetarist 
analysis,  the central bank should  avoid creating monetary  shocks.  Sec- 
ond,  a wide  class of monetary  rules led to the same fluctuations  in real 
activity,  since  real  effects  of  perceived  variations  in  money  would  be 
neutralized  by price-level  movements. 
3.5 CREDIBILITY 
Even  though  the  policy-ineffectiveness  result  was  fragile,  other  far- 
reaching implications carry over to most modern macroeconomic models, 
including  the  sticky-price  framework  that we  discuss  below.  Rational- 
expectations  reasoning  teaches that the effect of a given shock cannot be 
calculated without  understanding  its persistence  or the extent to which it 
was  expected  and prepared for in advance.  This point,  delivered  force- 
fully in Lucas (1976), revolutionized  policy  analysis,  implying  that one 
cannot  predict  the  effect  of  a policy  action  at a point  in  time  without 
taking account  of the nature of the policy  regime from which  it comes. 
Sargent (1986) tied these  ideas  explicitly to the nature of the inflation 
process: "inflation only seems to have a momentum  of its own.  It is actu- 
ally the long-term  government  policy of persistently  running large defi- 
cits and creating money  at high rates that imparts the momentum  to the 
inflation rate."12  Reviewing  a series of historical episodes  in which coun- 
tries  tried  to  reduce  high  inflation  rates,  he  argued  that  the  costs  of 
disinflation-forgone  output-were  much  smaller if the government's 
11. McCallum (1980) discusses  the robustness  of the policy neutrality proposition. 
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commitment  to disinflation was credible than if it was not. Yet, ironically, 
the  new  classical  macroeconomic  model  assigned  little  importance  to 
credibility. In that model,  the future intentions  of the central bank are 
very important for the evolution  of the price level, because they affect ex- 
pected inflation,  but they are of limited relevance for real activity so long 
as  they  are  accurately  perceived.  Consequently,  while  many  central 
banks viewed  credibility as important, they were reluctant to use the new 
classical  macroeconomic  model  for analysis  of monetary  policy  issues. 
4. Real  Business  Cycles 
Although  rational expectations  were introduced into macroeconomics  to 
study the links between  real and nominal variables, its implications were 
more systematically  worked  out within  the real-business-cycle  research 
program.  The  strong  monetary  neutrality  built  into  RBC models  has 
precluded  their  widespread  use  in  macroeconomic  policy  analysis  to 
date.  But we  see  RBC logic  as  a central part of  the  New  Neoclassical 
Synthesis.  One  reason  is  that the  RBC program  constructs  models  in 
which  the alternative policies  can be compared on the basis of measures 
of the utility benefits  or costs,  rather than on the basis of ad hoc objec- 
tives.  Another  is  that  the  RBC framework  allows  for  the  analysis  of 
policy  and  other  shocks  in  the  dynamic-stochastic  context  of  a fully 
specified  system,  as called  for by rational-expectations  reasoning.  The 
RBC program integrates  and clarifies the intertemporal substitution  that 
is at the heart of macroeconomics-involving  consumption,  investment, 
and labor-supply  behavior-and  in so doing it clarifies the determinants 
of the real rate of interest.  Finally, RBC models  provide insights  into the 
nature  of  cyclical  nonneutralities  in  NNS  models  and  also  describe 
macroeconomic  outcomes  under neutral monetary policy. 
4.1 THE  CORE  ELEMENTS  OF RBC  MODELS 
The  RBC approach  employs  real general  equilibrium  models  to  study 
macroeconomic  phenomena.  One key element  is the intertemporal opti- 
mization  approach  to  consumption  and  labor  supply.  Another  is  the 
similar intertemporal  analysis  of investment  and labor demand,  arising 
from the profit-maximizing  decisions  of firms. Plans of households  and 
firms are then  combined  into a general equilibrium, in which  quantities 
and prices are simultaneously  determined. 
4.2 PRODUCTIVITY  SHOCKS 
The RBC program  focused  macroeconimists  on  the procylicality of the 
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and  Plosser  (1989),  the  basic  RBC model  was  seen  to  be  capable  of 
generating  business  cycles  that resembled  those  of the  U.S.  and  other 
economies  when  it was  driven  by Solow  residuals.  For the purpose  of 
defining  these  residuals  and for discussing  other issues  below, we write 
the  production  function  as  constant  returns  to  scale  in  labor (n) and 
capital (k), shifting  through  time  as a result of productivity  shocks  (a): 
Yt =  aF(nt,  kt).  (4.1) 
In the  RBC model,  productivity  shocks  have  two  sets  of  effects  on 
output.  One is that they mechanically  raise or lower output,  as stressed 
by Solow  in his famous  decomposition, 
dyt  dn,  -+  sdk  +  -,  (4.2) 
Yt  t  nt  k  at 
where  sk and  s,  are  the  factor shares  of  labor and  capital.  However, 
productivity  shocks  also  exert  effects  on  macroeconomic  activity,  be- 
cause  they  affect  marginal  product  (factor demand)  schedules.  These 
marginal  (substitution)  influences  interact with  the  smoothing  motiva- 
tion built into households'  preferences  to govern  the dynamic response 
of the economy.  A temporary rise in current productivity,  for example, 
makes  it more valuable  for households  to work (to cut back on leisure) 
and  to  invest  (to  postpone  current  consumption).  Within  the  RBC 
model,  these  mechanisms  explain, for example,  the procylicality of labor 
input  and  the  high-amplitude  response  of  investment.  The  RBC ap- 
proach forces a researcher to explain the response  of the macroeconomy 
in terms of substitution  and wealth  effects on households. 
A major question  about the RBC approach has been the measurement 
of productivity  shocks,  particularly whether  the Solow method  mismea- 
sures factor inputs.  Subsequent  research has focused  on variable capital 
utilization  as one  source  of mismeasurement:  recent work by Burnside, 
Eichenbaum,  and  Rebelo  (1995) cuts down  the variability of the Solow 
residual  so  substantially  that  an  adherent  of  the  RBC approach  may 
worry that there is little left in the way of productivity  shocks. 
4.3 RATIONALIZING  HIGH  SUPPLY  ELASTICITIES 
By focusing  attention  on the supply  side, RBC modelers provoked  many 
questions,  one of the most basic being: are the high-amplitude  labor sup- 
ply variations assumed  in RBC models counterfactual? Early RBC models 
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worker (the representative  agent) changing the number of hours worked. 
This mechanism  is arguably inconsistent  with  microeconomic  evidence 
on labor supply. 
Yet, over  the  course  of the business  cycle there are large changes  in 
work effort. As illustrated by comparison of panels (a) and (c) of Figure 1, 
these mostly  arise from changes  in the number of employed  individuals, 
rather than in the number of hours worked by each individual.  Important 
modifications  of  the  basic  RBC framework  have  modeled  such  move- 
ments  into and out of the work force, yielding  extremely high aggregate 
labor supply  elasticities while maintaining  small micro elasticities.  Other 
recent studies  feature variable capital utilization,  with a supply of capital 
services that is highly  sensitive  to changes  in factor prices so that utiliza- 
tion  is  strongly  procyclical.13 Overall,  the  modern  RBC approach  de- 
scribes a macroeconomy  that is highly sensitive to real shocks. Hall (1991) 
points  out  that  many  approaches  to  business  cycles  require  a  "high- 
substitution"  economy  like that constructed by RBC researchers. 
4.4 MONEY  IN RBC  MODELS 
Early in  the  RBC research  program,  a monetary  sector  was  added  to 
explore  the  types  of  business-cycle  correlations  between  money  and 
output  that could  emerge  if productivity  shocks  were  the main driving 
factor (King and Plosser,  1984). At a later stage of research, the effects of 
the  inflation  tax were  explored  (Cooley  and  Hansen,  1989). From this 
research and other work over the last decade,  a number of conclusions 
have  emerged  that  are broadly  shared  by  macroeconomists.  First, en- 
dogenous  variations  in money  supply  arising from the joint actions  of 
private  banks  and  the  monetary  authority  at least  partly  explain  the 
business-cycle  correlation of money  and output.  Second,  while versions 
of RBC models  supplemented  with  a monetary  sector can in principle 
explain the correlation of money  and output,  they do less well at explain- 
ing the cyclical variation in real and nominal  interest rates (Sims,  1992), 
suggesting  that there is more to the cycle than real productivity  shocks 
that cause  sympathetic  variations in money. Third, the predicted conse- 
quences  of  cyclical  variations  in  expected  inflation  are  quantitatively 
small within  flexible-price models,  if money  demand is modeled  via cash 
in  advance  or  with  an  explicit  transactions  technology.  That  is,  for 
business-cycle  purposes,  an RBC model with an explicit monetary mech- 
anism works a lot like an RBC model with a money demand function just 
tacked on after a real general equilibrium analysis. 
13. Cho and Cooley  (1994) show  how heterogeneity  of fixed costs of going to work can lead 
to large work-force adjustments  and small hours adjustments.  These labor supply  and 
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4.5 ANALYSIS  OF SUSTAINED  INFLATION 
Studies  of the costs  of steady  inflation conducted  under the RBC rubric 
have led to a revised understanding  of the benefits that may be obtained 
from lowering  inflation.  A basic reference  in this area is Lucas (1993), 
who  calculates that the welfare cost of a 7% inflation may be about 1% of 
output  using  a variant of the  shopping-time  model  of money  demand. 
Since Lucas's transactions  technology  has no satiation level  of cash bal- 
ances,  most  of his estimated  gains from lowering  inflation to the Fried- 
man  (1969) level  arise as a result of deflation.  However,  estimating  the 
parameters of a shopping-time  model  with annual U.S.  data over 1915- 
1992, Wolman  (1996) concludes  that the U.S.  experience  appears  more 
consistent  with  a transactions  technology  with  a satiation level  of cash 
balances.  This alternative  money  demand  model  provides  roughly  the 
same  total gain from lowering  inflation,  but locates  most  of it between 
7% and zero inflation. 
4.6 FISCAL  POLICY  AND FISCAL  SHOCKS  IN AN RBC  SETTING 
Another  important  topic  of  RBC analysis  has  been  the  study  of fiscal 
policy  and  fiscal  disturbances  in  real general  equilibrium.  In the  RBC 
model,  changes  in  tax rates have  a powerful  effect  on  real activity. In 
particular, variations  in a comprehensive  income  or sales  tax affect the 
after-tax real factor returns  to labor and capital, inducing  substitutions 
between  goods  and  across  time  that influence  the  quantities  of work 
effort and  investment  chosen  by  a representative  agent.  For example, 
the after-tax real wage  is 
aF(nt,  kt) 
wt =  (1 -  r)a  ,  (4.3) 
Ont 
where  rt is the tax rate at date t and wt is the real wage  rate at t. Thus, 
from the  standpoint  of the marginal return to work,  the tax works just 
like  a productivity  shock.  Accordingly,  changes  in  comprehensive  in- 
come taxes exert a high-octane  influence  on the RBC model. 
RBC studies  of actual U.S. fiscal shocks,  like that of McGrattan (1994), 
come to an ironic conclusion.  Changes  in tax rates have powerful  effects 
on  macroeconomic  activity, but  since  the  variation  in  measured  U.S. 
capital and income  tax rates at business-cycle  frequencies is small, these 
shocks do not contribute much to overall business-cycle  variability. How- 
ever, we  see below  that changes  in markups can be interpreted as taxes 
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5. New  Keynesian  Economics 
The New  Keynesian  approach  to macroeconomics  evolved  in response 
to the  monetarist  controversy  and  to fundamental  questions  raised by 
Lucas's critique, and in order to provide an alternative to the competitive 
flexible-price  framework  of RBC analysis.  Our discussion  of this wide- 
ranging  research program  will be divided  into  three parts.  We first re- 
view  early work  by  Gordon  (1982) and  Taylor (1980). We then  discuss 
more  recent  new  Keynesian  microeconomic  foundations,  which  high- 
light monopolistic  competition  and costly  price adjustment.  Finally, we 
focus on optimizing  price adjustment  in a dynamic setting. 
5.1 FIRST-GENERATION  NEW  KEYNESIAN  MODELS 
In first generation  New  Keynesian  models,  Gordon  (1982) and  Taylor 
(1980) modernized  the specification  of the wage-price  block to incorpo- 
rate monetarist  and rational-expectations  insights. 
5.1.1  Gordon's  Price Equation  On the empirical side,  Gordon (1982) esti- 
mated price dynamics  using  a monetarist proximate  exogeneity  of nominal 
aggregate  demand.  Abstaining  from separate consideration  of nominal 
wages  because  he viewed  their dynamics as essentially  identical to those 
of prices,  Gordon estimated  price equations  of the form 
t =  A(L)rTt_1  +  G(log  Yt -  log  Yt-1) +  pst  +  rt,  (5.1) 
where  Trt  = log Pt -  log Pt-_  is the rate of inflation, A(L)  is a polynomial  in 
the lag operator, log Yt -  log Yt-1  is nominal income growth,  pst captures 
the effects of observable  price shocks,  and 1t is an error term. 
Gordon  interpreted  the  A(L) coefficients  as indicating  how  the  price 
level  gradually  adjusts  toward  a  long-run  level  required  by  nominal 
income  and a "natural rate" level of real activity. There were three main 
findings  of Gordon's  investigation:  First, there was  a numerically  small 
value  of  G in  the  price  equation.  Estimating  quarterly price equations 
over  nearly  a century  of  data and  several  subsamples,  Gordon  found 
slope  coefficients  in  the  range  of  G =  0.10,  indicating  a small  impact 
effect of output  on prices equal to G/(1 +  G) = 0.09.14 Second,  lags were 
estimated  to be very  important  in the price equation: the mean  lag be- 
tween  output  and prices was more than a year. Gordon interpreted this 
as evidence  for gradual adjustment  of the price level to changes in nomi- 
nal expenditure. 
14. The impact effect is interpreted using the identity log Y, -  log Y,-  = log Pt -  log Pt-_ + 
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However,  Gordon  also  found  remarkable  changes  in  his  estimates 
when  the ninety  years of data was  split into three or more subperiods. 
Within the early subsample  running from 1892 to 1929, there were major 
shifts in the effects of nominal income  during the war period 1915-1922. 
In particular, the estimated  coefficient on nominal income rose substan- 
tially, with  a big  difference  arising between  expected  nominal  income 
growth  (G =  0.47) and unexpected  nominal  income  growth  (G =  0.25). 
Measures  of  supply  shocks-notably  energy  and  commodity  prices- 
became  increasingly  important in the post-World War II sample period. 
Finally, the  sum  of coefficients  on  lagged  inflation,  A(1), rose  substan- 
tially from 0.4 during  1892-1929  to more than 1 during 1954-1980. 
5.1.2  Taylor's Rational-Expectations  Approach to Wage Setting  The  most 
hardy  of  the  first  generation  of  New  Keynesian  rational-expectations 
macroeconomic  models  is that of Taylor (1980). In modem  terminology, 
Taylor's vision  was  that the firm and its workers  set a fixed wage  over 
the life of a J-period contract. Wage bargains were  assumed  to be stag- 
gered  through  time with  1/J of the  contracts set each period.  The sim- 
plest mathematical representation  of Taylor's wage-setting  mechanism  is 
as follows.15 The nominal wage  rate set at date t, log Wt, depends  on the 
average price level expected  over the contract, (1/J) E - 
Et  log Pt,+;  on the 
average labor-market tightness  [incorporated as (h/J)  -JI Etet+j,  where et  is 
the labor-market tightness  at date t and h governs  the wage  response  to 
this tightness];  and on a wage  shock (vt): 
1  -  h i-1 
log W: =  2  E, log Pt+j  +  Ee  +?  + vt.  (5.2) 
I  i=o  J  j=o 
Taylor (1980) adopted  a very  simple  macroeconomic  model  to focus  on 
the  consequences  of this  wage-setting  behavior.  First, Taylor specified 
that the price level  was  a simple  average of wages,  motivated  by refer- 
ence  to  a  monopolist  with  constant  marginal  cost  selecting  a  fixed 
markup, 
15. Taylor (1980) assumed  that current wages  depended  on past and future wages: 
J-1  1-1  h j-1 
log WV-  =  b  log W_j + E  bjE  log Wt+j  +  -  Etet+ +  V 
j=0  j=0  I  j=0 
with  the  contract  weights  being  b. =  (1/(1  -  J)) (1  -  (jl)).  This  is  a reduced  form 
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1 l-1 
logP  =  log  W_j.  (5.3) 
J  j=o 
Second,  like Gordon (1982), Taylor made the monetarist assumption  that 
nominal  expenditure  was  determined  by  a  quantity  equation.  Third, 
Taylor assumed  that labor-market tightness  related to output: et = gl  log 
Yt. Fourth,  Taylor assumed  an  activist  money  stock rule for monetary 
policy, specifically  that 
log M,  =  g2 log P.  (5.4) 
As with  the earlier New  Classical rational-expectations  models,  Taylor's 
rational-expectations  model  required  specification  of the monetary  au- 
thority's  behavior.  Rather than  taking  the  monetary  authority  to  be  a 
source of business-cycle  impulses,  he viewed  it as adjusting  the money 
stock to the price level with a response  coefficient g2. 
5.1.3  Business-Cycle  and Policy  Implications  of Taylor's  Framework There are 
four  implications  of  the  Taylor framework.  First,  Taylor produced  a 
"humped-shaped"  pattern of cyclical output  (unemployment)  dynamics 
in response  to wage  shocks  vt, which Taylor suggested  was a measure of 
success,  because  a number of empirical researchers had estimated  time- 
series models  which implied such profiles.  Second, Taylor demonstrated 
that the policy rule mattered for the evolution of real activity. Third, Taylor 
highlighted  a new  monetary  policy  trade-off between  the variability of 
output  and  the  variability of inflation  within  his model,  even  with  the 
maintained  assumption  that there was no long-run trade-off between  the 
rate of inflation and the level of output.  If velocity shocks were small, for 
example,  then  a central bank could  largely eliminate  real variability by 
accommodating  price-level  movements  (g2 close to one),  but this would 
require greater variability in the price level.  Fourth, he showed  that ra- 
tional expectations  mattered a great deal-for  the response  of the econ- 
omy to shocks and for the design  of monetary policy rules-by  contrast- 
ing his results with those  based on extrapolative expectations. 
Importantly,  sticky-wage  and  sticky-price rational-expectations  mod- 
els like Taylor's also explained  the main findings  of Gordon,  at least in 
broad  form.  Lags  of  nominal  wages  and  prices  were  important  state 
variables in these models,  reflecting gradual adjustment to real and nomi- 
nal shocks.  Moreover the effects of proximately exogenous  variations in 
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were  expected  to be,  since (5.2) indicated that price expectations  played 
a major role in wage  setting. 
Taken together  with  his  subsequent  work on larger macroeconomet- 
ric models  incorporating  gradual price adjustment,  Taylor's theoretical 
model  had a major intellectual  impact.  Yet, at the same time,  there was 
an uneasiness  about the staggered  wage  models  of Taylor. In the United 
States,  in particular, only  a small portion of the labor force was  subject 
to explicit multiperiod  contracts. Further, the microeconomic  underpin- 
nings  of the wage-setting  process were sketchy.16 
5.2 SECOND-GENERATION  NEW  KEYNESIAN  MODELS 
In the  next  stage  of  research,  New  Keynesian  economists  shifted  the 
location of nominal  stickiness  from wages  to prices.17 In this new  work, 
price-setting  firms were explicitly modeled  as monopolistic  competitors. 
The imperfect-competition  framework was  used  to explain the real out- 
put effect of money  when  prices were  subject to costs of adjustment,  to 
develop  various  amplification  mechanisms,  and to highlight  the poten- 
tial social costs of business  cycles. 
5.2.1  Explicit  Monopolistic  Competition  Models  During the 1980s, implica- 
tions of monopolistic  competition  were explored in a wide range of fields, 
including  economic  growth,  international trade and finance, and macro- 
economics.  In each case, imperfect competition held the promise of under- 
standing  issues  that were  puzzling  from the perspective  of competitive 
theory. In macroeconomics,  monopolistic  competition  was important for 
analyzing how firms set prices. In the standard competitive  setting, firms 
take market prices as given and adjust quantity in response to variations in 
prices  and  costs.  By  contrast,  in  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki  (1987) and 
Rotemberg (1987), firms are monopolistic  competitors and set prices in or- 
der to maximize profit. These studies take consumption  to be an aggregate 
of a continuum  of differentiated  products,  ct = [J  ct(z)l-l'dz](1-)'/.  An indi- 
vidual firm producing  the product z faces the constant elasticity demand 
C,(Z)  =c  ( 
P,  (5.5) 
16. See Barro  (1977). 
17. These  New Keynesian  developments  are  encapsulated  in Mankiw  and Romer  (1991)  and 
surveyed in Mankiw (1990),  Romer  (1993),  and Rotemberg  (1987).  In part, New Key- 
nesian economists  sought to avoid theoretical  criticisms  of wage contracting  models. In 
part, they thought that price  stickiness  seemed pervasive  and sticky-price  models more 
consistent  with the somewhat  procyclical  real  wages found in the data  (Mankiw,  1990). 250 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
which  is shifted  by the aggregate  price level  and the level  of aggregate 
consumption  demand.  Investment  and government  purchases  could be 
viewed  similarly  as aggregates  of differentiated  products,  leading  to a 
version  of (5.5) that replaced ct with an aggregate demand measure.  The 
implied form of the (perfect) price index associated with aggregate expen- 
diture is 
Pt=  (jP(z)-  dz  (5.6) 
Accordingly,  with  a nominal  marginal  cost  of  t,  an  optimizing  firm 
would  set  its  price  at  a constant  markup  over  marginal  cost,  Pt(z) = 
[E/(e  -  1)] t,  with the markup being given by the conventional  formula. 
Thus,  monopolistic  competition  rationalizes  a firm setting  a price and 
setting  it at a level  greater  than  marginal  cost.  Imperfect  competition 
does  not, by itself, rationalize nominal  stickiness. 
5.2.2  Incorporation  of Nominal Stickiness  At  the  microeconomic  level, 
stickiness  of nominal  prices is a feature of our everyday  life. Thus, if we 
are developing  "micro foundations  for macroeconomics,"  it is important 
to have  models  that can explain  these  observed  pricing practices.  The 
most  direct  explanation  is  that  small  real  costs  of  changing  nominal 
prices-menu  costs-account  for sticky prices. It is an open  question  as 
to  whether  small  menu  costs  can  lead  to  sustained  stickiness  of  the 
prices of individual  goods,  particularly in a situation of positive inflation. 
For the  most  part, in the New  Keynesian  modeling  approach,  the  dis- 
crete and  occasional  adjustment  of individual  prices is simply  a feature 
of the environment,  rationalized  in more or less elaborate ways.  In this 
paper, as in that literature, we focus less on why individual prices might 
be set in advance  and more on the implications  that discrete and occa- 
sional individual  price adjustment  has for the behavior of the aggregate 
price level and real economic  activity. 
5.2.3  The  Causes and  Consequences of  Monetary Business Cycles  New 
Keynesian  economists  also have  stressed  that imperfect  competition  is 
important  for the  effect  of  money  on  output  if there  is  nominal  price 
stickiness.  To see  the power  of this argument,  think about the perfect- 
competition  case.  If demand  rises, but price remains the same,  the firm 
will not respond,  routing its potential customers  elsewhere.  By contrast, 
if its price is fixed at a level that exceeds  marginal cost, then it is desirable 
for an individual  firm to expand  its output if its demand  rises. The easy 
case is if marginal cost is unrelated  to the firm's output,  for then it will 
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markup. Even if marginal cost rises with output,  either at the level of the 
firm or in general  equilibrium,  then  it will continue  to be profitable to 
satisfy demand  so long  as price exceeds  marginal cost. In response  to a 
general  economic  expansion-a  rise in ct in (5.5) above-it  is plausible 
that marginal cost increases because firms must pay higher real wages  to 
secure  the labor input  to produce  additional  output.  Accordingly,  New 
Keynesians  highlight  the  importance  of procyclical movements  in real 
wages  and marginal cost. 
As a related matter, New  Keynesian analysis also suggests  a new set of 
conclusions  for welfare analysis of the business  cycle. With monopolistic 
competition,  market power of firms means that there is too low a level of 
employment  and output  on average.  The New  Keynesian  analysis  thus 
provides  a coherent  account  of the temptation  to expand  the economy 
present  in  the  literature on  time-inconsistent  monetary  policies  (Barro 
and  Gordon,  1983).18 Further,  monetary  policymakers  should  not  be 
indifferent  about  short-run  changes  in  employment  that  arise  from 
changes  in money  when  prices are sticky. Notably, a decrease in employ- 
ment  and  output  that  results  from  a  contractionary  monetary  policy 
lowers  the  welfare  of  the  representative  individual  by  increasing  mo- 
nopoly  distortions. 
5.2.4  The Origins and Implications  of Monopolistic  Competition  There are a 
range of economic  mechanisms,  of course,  that are consistent  with  mo- 
nopolistic  competition.  To us,  the  most  plausible  is that firms face im- 
portant  fixed  costs,  including  general  overhead  costs.  These  suggest 
modifying  the production  function  to 
Yt  = at[F(nt,  kt) -  <],  (5.7) 
where  (  is  a measure  of  fixed  costs,  which  plausibly  are assumed  to 
display the same factor intensity requirements and technical shifts which 
govern final output.  With such a production function, the representative 
firm has constant  marginal cost (at given  factor prices) and diminishing 
average cost. 
Hall (1988) demonstrates  that the modified  Solow decomposition  is 
d=  (1  +  Sn  s  -  k +  S-  -,  (5.8) 
Yt  nt  kt  at 
18. Ireland (1996b) provides  a fully  articulated model  of how  imperfect competition  and 
sticky  prices  lead  to  excessive  inflation  when  the  monetary  authority  is  unable  to 
commit its future actions. 252 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
where  s,  and  sk are total cost  shares  and 4 is the  ratio of overhead  to 
variable cost.  This decomposition  highlights  the consequences  of over- 
head  costs.  First, the  standard Solow  residual varies with  the business 
cycle even if there are no productivity shocks. Second, there is an amplifi- 
cation mechanism,  so that a one-percent  change in labor changes  output 
by (1 +  )) sn percent. 
The New  Keynesian  approach allows for a wide range of assumptions 
about  the  nature  and  extent  of  imperfect  competition.  If there  are no 
pure  monopoly  profits,  then  the  markup  of  price  over  marginal  cost 
must  simply  cover  overhead  costs,  i.e.,  we  must  have  ,  =  1 +  4 on 
average, which we assume  throughout  our discussion.  In various quanti- 
tative exercises  below,  it will also be necessary  for us to take a stand on 
the  value  of the  steady-state  markup.  Compared  to some  other recent 
studies,  we  take  a small  value,  ,L =  1.1,  which  corresponds  to a 10% 
"net" markup and a demand  elasticity of about 11.19  We do this for two 
reasons.  First,  it is  broadly  consistent  with  observed  markups  in  the 
construction  and  automobile  service  industries,  i.e.,  markups  in  the 
range of 7% to 15% in contracts and bills of sale. Second,  it is consistent 
with the detailed  empirical studies  of Basu and Fernald (1997). 
5.3 DYNAMIC  PRICE-SETTING  MODELS 
Models  of price dynamics  based on fixed real costs of changing  nominal 
prices  were  first developed  in  the  early  1970s. In these  models,  firms 
choose  the timing and magnitude  of their price adjustments  in response 
to the  state of the economy,  including  the average rate of inflation  and 
the stage of the business  cycle. This state-dependent  approach to pricing is 
attractive from a microeconomic  perspective  because (1) individual firms 
are observed  to discretely  adjust  their prices at infrequent  intervals  of 
apparently  stochastic length,  and (2) firms are more likely to adjust price 
when  there  are  large  shocks  to  their  markets  or  sustained  inflation. 
However,  it has  proved  difficult to introduce  this form of price adjust- 
ment  into  complete  macroeconomic  models.  Caplin  and  Leahy  (1991) 
indicated  that  the  consequences  could  be  major, but  also  that  many 
simplifications  were  necessary  to characterize the imperfectly  competi- 
tive equilibrium with costly price adjustment,  including  extreme restric- 
tions on the rules of the central bank, on the behavior of consumers,  and 
on the nature of money  demand.  Thus, while state-dependent  pricing is 
natural,  existing  models  have  been  ill suited  for empirical  analysis  or 
examination  of  alternative  monetary  policy  rules.  For this  reason,  the 
19. Using  ,u = e/(e -  1) as in the text above,  ,/  =  1.1 corresponds  to e =  11. The  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  *  253 
emphasis  in New  Keynesian  literature has been  on time-dependent  price 
adjustment  rules which  specify that firms have exogenous  opportunities 
for price adjustment. 
5.3.1  An Intertemporal  Approach  to Price Setting  Following  Calvo (1983), 
we consider  how  a rational firm would  select its price today given that it 
will have  to keep  it fixed for an interval of stochastic length.  To opera- 
tionalize  this idea,  we use notation and structure from a recent study of 
time  and  state-dependent  pricing.20 As  in  the  imperfect-competition 
model above, we can posit a large number of firms-technically  a contin- 
uum  of firms-and  suppose  that a fraction ojt last adjusted  their price j 
periods  ago,  for j = 0, 1, . . .,  J -  1. Accordingly, the date-t conditional 
probability  of the  next  adjustment  at date  t + j is oj,t  +j/ot.  When  the 
demand elasticity is assumed  constant,  so that yt(z) = [Pt(z)/Pt]- dt  with Pt 
being the perfect price index and dt an aggregate demand construct, then 
the optimal price is restricted by 
E  EtJ- oiJ(A^t+/At))j,t+j(Pt+jP"+jdt+j) 
6  1  E,  (5.9)(A  /)  +(P+  )  4E-  1  Et  a-  [  J(At+j/At)  oj,t+j(Pt+j dt+j) 
where  st+j is nominal  marginal cost at t + j and  3At+,/At  is the discount 
factor for date-t + j contingent  cash flows.21 The general price adjustment 
rule (5.9) derives from an equating of marginal revenue and marginal cost 
in a dynamic setting and has a convenient  approximate form that we use 
below.22  In particular, when the inflation rate is close to zero, then log P*  is 
approximately log (E/(1  -  e)) + [l/-'j3hwohJ  f3'iojEt  log  t+j.  That is, the 
price is a discounted  distributed lead of expected nominal marginal cost, 
with the weights  related to the frequency distribution of price adjustment 
dates.  Equivalently,  denoting  real marginal cost  as  rt and  using  three 
20. Dotsey,  King,  and  Wolman  (1996). The approach  there is a generalization  of Calvo's 
(1983)  approach  to price  setting. 
21. Although we will focus on time-dependent  pricing  in our discussion below, there is 
some recent  work that has sought to make  the timing  of price  adjustment  endogenous 
within a framework  like that just discussed (Dotsey,  King, and Wolman,  1996).  There 
are  three  general  implications  of this line of research.  First,  the adjustment  probabilities 
,,  t+/wo,t  vary through time with the state variables  of the model, but we still obtain 
(5.9). Moreover,  the approximation  (5.10)  is robust  to state dependence, so long as the 
inflation  rate is close to zero. Second, the model must allow for time variations  in the 
resources  used in price adjustment.  However, since the levels of these resources  are 
assumed to be small in most New Keynesian  models, the direct resource  effects of 
these are likely to be minor.  Third,  there are time-varying  fractions  of the firms  which 
last adjusted  their prices  j = 1, 2, . .  J periods  ago. 
22. These approximations  are derived  in Dotsey, King, and Wolman  (1996). 254 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
identities  (log It  = log Pt + log  t, log  o6  =  -log  /t,  and log  L = log (e/(1 - 
e)), we  can express  the optimal price as 
1  1-1 
log P*  1  [  Btj  (EtlogP log  (Pt+j/  lo  ))]  (5.10) 
h=o0  (h  ;=0 
i.e.,  as  depending  on  the  future  path  of  the  price  level  and  on  the 
deviation  of real marginal cost from its steady-state  level. 
5.3.2  The Price Level  To complete  the dynamic pricing model,  we  need 
an  equation  that  aggregates  prices  across  firms into  the  general  price 
level.  With all firms that adjust at date t choosing  Pt,  the perfect price 
aggregator is 
/J-1  \1/(-  e) 
Pt=  E  (P,  .)1-  (5.11) 
j=0 
so that the price level depends  on pricing decisions  and adjustment  pat- 
terns.  If variation in the adjustment  patterns is small over the business 
cycle-as  in time-dependent  models  or some state-dependent  models- 
and the inflation  rate is low, then  there is a comparable approximation, 
l-1 
log Pt  E  wj  log P*t,  (5.12) 
j=0 
which  we can pair with  (5.10). These two equations  (5.10) and (5.12) are 
a  convenient  representation  of  the  central  "price block"  of  the  NNS 
models  that we  describe in the next section. 
5.3.3  Comparison  with Taylor's  Dynamic System  Based on intertemporal 
optimization  and three simplifications  (low inflation,  constant  elasticity 
of demand,  and  small variations  in adjustment  patterns),  we  have  ob- 
tained  a pair  of  loglinear  equations  (5.10)  and  (5.12)  describing  price 
dynamics.  These  broadly  resemble  the  forward-looking  wage-setting 
and  backward-looking  price-level  equations  used  by  Taylor, but  with 
additional  flexibility in the distributed lead and lag mechanisms  because 
of the use of a stochastic  adjustment  model. 
There is,  however,  one notable omission:  there are no price shocks  in 
our pair of behavioral  expressions.  This is a common  outcome  in eco- 
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from more primitive  events  which  affect economic  decision  makers. As 
we shall see,  our optimization  approach allows for many types of events 
that are typically described as price shocks [as, for example, the commod- 
ity price variations included  by Gordon (1982) in his empirical specifica- 
tion].  However,  these  exert  an  influence  on  prices  through  marginal 
cost,  rather than directly, according to the theory developed  in the next 
section. 
6.  The  New Synthesis:  Description  and  Mechanics 
The  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  is  defined  by  two  central  elements. 
Building on new  classical macroeconomics  and RBC analysis,  it incorpo- 
rates intertemporal  optimization  and rational expectations  into dynamic 
macroeconomic  models.  Building  on  New  Keynesian  economics,  it in- 
corporates  imperfect  competition  and costly price adjustment.  Like the 
RBC program,  it  seeks  to  develop  quantitative  models  of  economic 
fluctuations. 
The  NNS  is  currently  displayed  in  three  distinct  modelling  scales. 
First, there are small analytical models  that can be used  to study a range 
of theoretical  and  empirical issues  while  retaining  sufficient tractability 
that  they  can  be  solved  by  hand.  Second,  there  are  medium-scale 
macroeconomic  models  analogous  to those  developed  by RBC research- 
ers that are being  used  to address  a wide  range of positive  and norma- 
tive  issues.23 Third,  there  is  the  new  FRB/US large-scale  model  of the 
American economy  developed  over the last few years, which is now  the 
principal model  employed  for policy  evaluation  by the Federal Reserve 
Board.24 
We call the new  style of macroeconomics  research the New  Neoclassi- 
cal Synthesis  because  it inherits the spirit of the old synthesis  discussed 
in Section 2. NNS  models  offer policy advice based on the idea that price 
stickiness  implies  that aggregate  demand  is a key  determinant  of real 
economic  activity  in  the  short  run.  NNS  models  imply  that monetary 
policy exerts a powerful  influence  on real activity. This has both positive 
and  normative  implications.  From a positive  point  of view,  the central 
23. A recent  partial  survey is contained  in Nelson (1997). 
24. Brayton  et al. (1996)  provide a description  of the new FRB-US  model, which incorpo- 
rates rational  expectations  and dynamic  specifications  into consumption,  investment, 
prices, and wages. The new model displays no long-run trade-off  between inflation 
and real activity.  Expectations  are central  to the dynamic consequences of monetary 
and fiscal actions. While the FRB-US  model does  not rely as completely on in- 
tertemporal  optimization  as some smaller  academic  models and contains a different 
process of wage determination,  it nevertheless shares many other central  structural 
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conclusion  is that economic  fluctuations  cannot be interpreted or under- 
stood  independently  of monetary  policy. This is true notwithstanding 
the fact that the RBC model  at the core of the NNS  assigns  a potentially 
large role to productivity,  fiscal policy, or relative price shocks.  From a 
normative  perspective  the  NNS  says  that aggregate  demand  must  be 
managed  by monetary policy in order to deliver efficient macroeconomic 
outcomes.  In other words,  the NNS creates an urgent demand for mone- 
tary policy advice. 
The New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  also supplies  that advice.  The combi- 
nation  of rational forward-looking  price setting,  monopolistic  competi- 
tion,  and RBC components  in the NNS  provides  guidance  for monetary 
policy based on the following  reasoning.  First of all, stationary monetary 
policy  must  respect  the  RBC determinants  of real economic  activity on 
average  over  time.  That  is,  even  though  output  may  be  demand- 
determined  on  a period-by-period  basis  in  the  NNS,  output  must  be 
supply-determined  on  average.  Second,  the NNS  locates  the transmis- 
sion of monetary policy to real activity in its influence  on the ratio of the 
average  firm's price to marginal cost  of production,  which  we  call the 
average  markup.  A monetary  policy  action which  raises aggregate  de- 
mand  raises  marginal cost and lowers  the average markup.  This lower 
average  markup  sustains  the  increase  in  output  and  employment,  be- 
cause it works like a tax reduction in an RBC setting.  Third, there is little 
long-run  trade-off  between  inflation  and  real activity  at low  inflation 
rates.  Illustrating  this  point,  we  show  within  a Tayloresque version  of 
optimal pricing-one  in which  the typical firm adjusts its price once per 
year-that  the steady-state  markup tax is minimized  by monetary policy 
that  pursues  near-zero  inflation.  Thus,  the  recommendation  is  that 
monetary  policy  should  stabilize  the path of the price level  in order to 
keep  output  at its potential.  This policy is "activist" in that the authority 
must manage aggregate demand to accommodate any supply-side  distur- 
bances  to output. 
The power of the new  synthesis  lies in the complementarity  of its New 
Keynesian  and RBC components,  which are compatible because  of their 
shared  reliance  on  microeconomics.  The New  Synthesis  allows  knowl- 
edge gained  from New  Keynesian  and RBC studies  to be brought to bear 
on  business-cycle  and  monetary  policy  questions  in a single  coherent 
model.  In doing  so, the new  synthesis  strengthens  our understanding  of 
economic  fluctuations.  This  and  subsequent  sections  elaborate  on  the 
key features and implications  of NNS models.  The balance of this section 
covers  some  preliminaries-the  basic mechanics  of markups,  the aver- 
age markup as a tax on economic  activity, relative prices as productivity 
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pies  and practical guidelines  for monetary  policy  are developed  in Sec- 
tions 7 and 8 respectively. 
6.1 HOW MONETARY  POLICY  AFFECTS  THE  REAL  ECONOMY 
In the new  synthesis,  monetary  policy has effects which  resemble those 
of  productivity  and  fiscal  shocks,  producing  substitution  and  wealth 
effects  on  the  economy  as  in  RBC models.  Variations in  the  average 
markup charged by firms affect marginal returns to factors in a way that 
is  similar  to  productivity  shocks  or  changes  in  comprehensive  taxes; 
changes  in relative prices across firms work like the level effects of pro- 
ductivity  shocks  or changes  in government  purchases. 
6.1.1  Marginal  and Average  Markups  Two measures of the markup play a 
major  role  in  models  of  the  NNS.25 As  suggested  above,  the  average 
markup  of price over marginal cost plays a prominent role in the transmis- 
sion  of monetary  policy. At any point in time,  though,  only a subset  of 
firms are adjusting  prices and setting a new markup level,  which we call 
the marginal  markup.26 
Formally, the marginal  markup is the ratio of price to marginal cost for 
firms that are adjusting  their price in period t, i.e., 
* - _  (6.1) 
We know  from Section 5 that P* depends  on the expectations that adjust- 
ing  firms  have  about  future  economic  conditions,  including  the  price 
level  and  marginal  cost.  The  average  markup  is  the  ratio of  price  to 
marginal cost for the average firm in the economy  (the ratio of the price 
level to marginal cost),27 
Pt 
t  -  _  (6.2) 
For analyzing  the determination  of real economic  activity within  period 
t,  it is  the  average  markup  that  is  central.  From this  standpoint,  it is 
25. Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1991)  provide a survey of alternative  theories of markup 
determination  and some suggestive  empirical  evidence  concerning  its cyclical  behavior. 
26. The terminology of average and marginal  markup  is used in a simpler model with 
Calvo-style  price setting by King  and Wolman  (1996). 
27. Capital  is assumed to be perfectly  mobile  among  firms,  so the marginal  cost is the same 
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important to stress that the average markup is just the reciprocal of real 
marginal cost, 
^t  1 
t-  =  - 
(6.3) 
Pt  At 
Thus,  procyclical  variation  of real marginal  cost-which  many  econo- 
mists  find  realistic-directly  implies  a countercyclical average  markup. 
The  average  and  marginal  markups  can move  very  differently  from 
each other in response  to shocks.  In response  to sustained  increases  in 
nominal  aggregate  demand,  for example,  the markup falls for firms not 
adjusting  price,  but  the  higher  inflation  motivates  adjusting  firms  to 
choose  a higher  markup.  Thus  the  short-run  effect  of a sustained  in- 
crease  in  demand  is  that  the  marginal  markup  rises  and  the  average 
markup falls. We will return to this point in Section 7. 
6.1.2  The  Average  Markup  as a Distorting Tax  Firms produce output with 
capital and  labor services.  Since they  are monopolistically  competitive, 
their  factor  demands  are  based  on  cost  minimization  at  a  demand- 
determined  output  level.  A necessary  condition  for cost minimization  is 
that the  value  marginal  product  of every  factor is equated  to its rental 
price.  Using  It  to  denote  nominal  marginal  cost  as above  and  letting 
Wt be the nominal  wage  rate, the efficiency  condition  for labor is Wt = 
ttat aF(nt, kt)/lnt, and there is a comparable condition for capital services. 
Dividing  each side of this expression  by the price level,  the real wage  is 
equated  to real marginal cost times the marginal product of labor. 
aF(nt, kt)  1  aF(nt, kt) 
Wt  =  tat  =  at  ,  (6.4) 
an,  t  an, 
where  the  last  equality  follows  directly  from the  fact that the  average 
markup and real marginal cost are reciprocals. Again,  a similar equality 
of real factor prices  and  real value  marginal products  holds  for capital 
services. 
Thus,  variations  in the average  markup work just like a comprehen- 
sive  tax which  a firm must  pay  on  factor inputs.  In the  case  of labor 
demand,  for example,  the average markup drives a wedge  between  the 
real wage  and the marginal product of labor, just as the tax wedge  did in 
(4.3). A higher markup raises the implicit tax on labor and capital. 
6.1.3  Relative Price Dispersion as a Productivity Shift  In addition  to the 
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ent in NNS  models.  Since some  individual  prices are sticky, changes  in 
the general price level bring about changes in relative prices. This disper- 
sion  of  relative  prices  results  in  a  misallocation  of  aggregate  output 
across alternative  uses  of final goods.  To exposit  this misallocation,  we 
define  aggregate  output  as the simple  sum28 
t =  yt(z)  dz. 
Suppose  further, as in (5.5) above,  that demand is given by the constant- 
elasticity specification,  y,(z) = [Pt(z)lPt]  -dt,  with dt  being the level of bene- 
fit derived  in final (consumption  or investment)  use.  Then the distribu- 
tion of relative prices influences  the extent of end-use  benefit from final 
output: 
Yt 
t  fol[p(z)lPt]-E  dz 
The normative  consequences  of variations in this composite  measure  of 
relative  prices  are analogous  to those  of a total-factor-augmenting  pro- 
ductivity  shock. 
6.2 THE  TRANSMISSION  MECHANISM 
The New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  provides  two  complementary  ways  of 
thinking  about the transmission  of monetary  policy  actions to real eco- 
nomic activity, which we view  as the aggregate-demand  and markup-tax 
approaches. 
6.2.1  Aggregate Demand  From a traditional perspective,  changes  in the 
quantity of money  alter aggregate demand,  which calls forth changes  in 
aggregate  supply.  When  NNS  models  are interpreted in this manner- 
taking real aggregate  demand  as determined  by monetary  policy-the 
results are sensible  at each point in time. Yet, this interpretation is incom- 
plete  for two  reasons:  the price level  may  respond  to monetary  policy 
within  the period,  and the focus is shifted away from real marginal cost, 
which  is an important element  of NNS  models.29 
28. This  definition  is  consistent  with  our  discussion  above  and  draws  on  Yun's  (1996) 
work,  which  shows  that it is consistent  with competitive  factor markets and demand- 
determined  output. 
29. The  evolution  of real marginal  cost  over  time  is  central to dynamic  pricing  models. 
Generally, changes  in real marginal cost are d (t, t = (s, dwJwt + sk dzJzt) -  daJat,  where 
z is  the  rental price  of  capital.  Thus,  small  responses  of wages  and  rental prices  to 260 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
6.2.2  The  Markup  Tax  An alternative view of the monetary transmission 
mechanism  is suggested  by the idea that the markup can be interpreted 
as a tax and, in particular, as a change in a generalized  output (sales) tax 
that affects the rewards to capital and labor. From an RBC perspective the 
influence  of monetary  policy on economic  activity can be analyzed using 
the relatively  well-understood  effects of comprehensive  tax changes  on 
macroeconomic  activity,  which  we  reviewed  in  Section  4  above.  This 
view  places movements  in the average markup and real marginal cost at 
the center  of the mechanism  by which  monetary  policy  influences  real 
economic  activity. It is similarly incomplete,  however,  in that it does  not 
incorporate  the influence  of the price level on the average markup, nor 
does  it recognize  the role of real marginal cost in the evolution  of prices. 
Yet, the average markup remains a useful summary statistic for monetary 
transmission. 
6.3 THE  POWER  AND LIMITATIONS  OF MONETARY  POLICY 
Like its  namesake  predecessor,  the  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  views 
monetary  policy  as  having  the  potential  to exert a major influence  on 
economic  activity, though  within  clearly defined  limits.  Moreover,  that 
influence  can likewise  be  understood  to operate  via distortions,  albeit 
different ones  than identified  in the original synthesis  of the 1960s. 
6.3.1  What Monetary Policy Can Do  To illustrate the power  of monetary 
policy, it is useful  to study the simplest possible  price-setting model,  one 
with two-period  staggered  price-setting.  In this setting,  it might be sup- 
posed  that monetary  policy has limited power for influencing  real activ- 
ity because  pricing decisions  are made just one  period in advance,  but 
we will see that monetary policy is still very powerful.  In the two-period 
setting  with  wo =  to  =  ?,  the  approximate  equation  for the  price level 
(5.12) is log Pt = '(log  P:  +  log  P*t-).  The forward-looking  price-setting 
equation  (5.10) is 
log  Pt  =  1  1  +  [log  P,  +  log(t/qi)  +  3 EtPt+l +  13  log  Et(qlt+l/q)] 
changes in output, as suggested by the U.S. aggregate  data  and built  into RBC  models, 
imply small responses of marginal  cost. More  specifically,  it is necessary  to look behind 
the preceding cost decomposition  to factor-market  equilibrium  in order to determine 
the responsiveness of marginal  cost and to gain a more complete  understanding  of the 
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Combining  the equations  in this two-period  price block, we can express 
the price level as 
log Pt = log P-1  + log (qt/h) 
+2  B/3  log Et (fit+j/l).  (6.5) 
j=1 
This  rational-expectations  solution  for  the  price  level  displays  two 
important  features  that  carry over  to  longer-horizon  pricing  models. 
First, the  price level  is partly predetermined  by prices  set in the  past. 
Second,  prices  set by currently adjusting  firms depend  on current and 
future real marginal cost.  In fact, the price level depends  on an infinite 
distributed  lead  of  expected  real marginal cost  even  though  each  firm 
must  keep  its  price fixed  for only  two  periods.  Expectations  of future 
real marginal  cost  matter for current pricing because  each  firm knows 
that it will keep  its price fixed for some  period of time.  Moreover, each 
firm  cares  about  what  prices  will  be  next  period  in  setting  its  price 
today, and  so it cares what  prices firms will set next period,  and so on 
into the future. 
In order to think about the evolution of the price level and output in this 
simple NNS  model we need to understand  the behavior of real marginal 
cost. To do so, recall once more that real marginal cost is just the reciprocal 
of the average markup, so we can write log (/jL,/) =  -log  (fr/0/). The RBC 
analysis  above  indicated  that variations  in the  markup tax can exert a 
powerful  inverse  effect on employment  and output.  Such effects can be 
complex  in a fully dynamic RBC setting,  but for heuristic purposes  con- 
sider the simple inverse  relationship 
log 
-  =  -<p(log Yt  -  log Yt),  (6.6) 
where  Yt is  the  flexible  price  level  of  output,  i.e.,  that  obtained  in  a 
noncompetitive  RBC model  with  a constant  markup ,/.  Since real mar- 
ginal cost is, in turn, given by log(t/qi)  =  <p(log  Yt  -  log Yt), the parame- 
ter  'p is  the  elasticity  of  real marginal cost  with  respect  to  an  "output 
gap." 
Now  suppose  that monetary  equilibrium is given  by a quantity equa- 
tion such as (3.1): log Mt = log Pt + log yt -  log vt, where v, is the velocity 
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tion with the price level and markup expressions,  we arrive at an expres- 
sion  relating the money  stock to current and expected  future markups: 
log (Mt) = log (P*  ) + log Yt + log (vt) 
- 
1 + 
log (Lt/L)  -  2 E  1  log E, (At+jl).  (6.7) 
j=l 
Thus as long  as the monetary  authority follows  a policy that supports  a 
determinate  distributed  lead  of  expected  markups  (a  relatively  weak 
condition),  the  preceding  expression  indicates  that  it  can  choose  the 
money  stock  to produce  an arbitrary pattern of small variations in the 
average  markup over time.  The monetary  authority would  have similar 
leverage  over the path of the markup, real marginal cost, and output in 
more general NNS  models  as well. 
One way  to summarize  this power  is that the monetary authority can 
choose  an  arbitrary stationary  stochastic  process  for  the  markup  tax 
relative  to  a mean  /u.30  However,  the  monetary  authority  can produce 
variations  in the average markup only by accepting  the implications  for 
prices  and  money.  In  particular,  markup  stabilization  and  price-level 
stabilization  are  intimately  related  in  NNS  models,  a  point  we  shall 
return to when  we  discuss  the role of monetary policy. 
6.3.2  What  Monetary Policy Cannot  Do  However,  the analogy to taxation 
is  incomplete.  Although  the  monetary  authority  can  choose  how  the 
markup tax moves  through  time, there is little that it can do to affect the 
steady-state  level of the markup, because the NNS incorporates forward- 
looking  price setting.  As we  discuss  in the next section,  at low inflation 
rates the level  of the steady-state  markup is nearly invariant to the infla- 
tion  rate and  so  is  essentially  determined  by  the  extent  of  monopoly 
power in the private sector. In addition,  there are some restrictions across 
the short run and long  run, as in any rational-expectations  model.  The 
more  persistent  the  monetary  authority's  planned  movements  in  the 
markup tax, the larger are their inflationary consequences. 
7.  Guiding  Principles  for Monetary  Policy 
The New Neoclassical  Synthesis makes the strong recommendation  that a 
central bank should  target near-zero inflation. In this section we spell out 
30. When we state the power  of monetary policy this way, it is important to remember that 
we  are considering  the  sorts of small variations implicit in the loglinearizations  (5.10) 
and  (5.12),  respecting  the  requirement  that  all firms have  price at least  as  great as 
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the principles underlying  this prescription. For concreteness  and simplic- 
ity, we  work within  the time-dependent  price-setting  model  developed 
above.  The principles  are sufficiently  general,  however,  that they  will 
guide monetary policy in other NNS models as well. The role of monetary 
policy in the new  synthesis  derives from two sources.  First, the underly- 
ing microeconomic  structure suggests  that it.is desirable to stabilize the 
average  markup,  avoiding  a source  of  time-varying  distortions  to  the 
macroeconomy.  Second,  forward-looking  price-setting behavior makes it 
feasible  to design  simple  policies  that will accomplish  this stabilization. 
7.1 THE  OPTIMAL  RATE  OF INFLATION 
What are the implications  of the new  synthesis  for the optimal  rate of 
inflation? While a complete  analysis  of this topic is beyond  the scope  of 
the present  study,  we  can identify  several key features that are impor- 
tant. First, the rate of inflation affects the distribution of relative prices in 
any model with price stickiness,  which in turn has effects on the end-use 
value  of  output  that  we  described  above.  These  are minimized  when 
there is zero inflation.  Second,  the average markup depends  on the rate 
of  inflation:  in  the  example  that we  study  further below,  the  average 
markup  is  minimized  at a rate of inflation  that is  near zero.  Third, if 
resources  are expended  adjusting  prices,  then  these  are minimized  at 
zero inflation.  Hence,  on these  three grounds,  the incorporation of im- 
perfect  competition  and  price  stickiness  leads  to the  suggestion  that a 
rate of inflation close to zero is desirable. 
However,  Friedman (1969) earlier argued that it was desirable to have 
expected  deflation,  so that the short-term nominal interest rate was zero. 
Thus,  a complete  analysis  of the optimal rate of inflation must balance 
the monetary  benefits  from disinflation  with the distortion costs associ- 
ated with  deflation. 
7.1.1  Effects on  Markups31 Early Keynesian  analyses  recognized  that 
steady inflation would  erode the market power of firms, suggesting  bene- 
fits  to  sustained  inflation.  However,  dynamic  models  of  price  setting 
suggest  at best a small positive inflation rate on these grounds. Moreover, 
these models  of price setting also suggest  that larger rates of inflation will 
raise, rather than lower,  average markups because  of expected  inflation 
effects. We use Figure 3 to display the main ingredients of this conclusion. 
First, in any model with sticky prices, positive inflation does mechanically 
erode the relative prices of firms which are not adjusting, or, equivalently, 
31. The discussion  in this section draws heavily on King and Wolman (1996), who  analyze 
the  link  between  inflation  and  the  average  markup  in  a Calvo-style  model  of  price 
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Figure  3 THE  EFFECTS  OF STEADY-STATE  INFLATION 
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there will be higher relative prices for those  firms that are adjusting.  To 
provide  an idea  of the quantitative  importance  of this channel,  panel A 
shows  the effect of inflation on PIP*  with a demand elasticity of 11 and the 
4-quarter staggering  of price adjustment  suggested  by some  of Taylor's 
work (w = 0.25 forj = 0, 1, 2, 3). A 10%  annual inflation rate lowers P/P*  by 
about  4%. Second,  confronted  with  a situation  of  higher  steady-state 
inflation, a rational price-setting firm has an incentive to raise its marginal 
markup. Using the same parameter values as above, panel B shows  that a 
10% inflation  rate causes  ,*  =  P*/l  to increase  to  1.15 from the  zero- 
inflation  level  e/(E -  1) =  1.10. Thus,  firms raise the marginal markup 
substantially  in response  to ancitipated inflation. 
The average markup embodies both the inflation-erosion and expected- 
inflation  effects,  since  it  is  simply  the  product  /u =  (P*/P)  (p/p*).32 
32. It is possible to show analytically  that inflation  has a negative  effect on average  mark- 
ups near zero inflation: 
d-  = 
( 
if  -j=  -  -i 
- 
iw)  <  o. 
d7r  0=o  /  Yf  0  :1O 
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Accordingly,  panel  C displays  the  combined  effect  of inflation  on  the 
average  markup,  yielding  three  results  of  interest.  First, the  smallest 
value  of  the  average  markup  occurs  at  a  positive  inflation  rate,  but 
this  rate is not  very  different  from zero.  Second,  the effect of inflation 
on  the  markup  is  positive  at higher  inflation  rates.  Third,  the  overall 
effect  of  inflation  on  the  average  markup  is  very  small  quantitatively 
near  zero  inflation.  However,  larger  inflations  actually  raise  rather 
than  lower  the  average  markup:  increasing  the  inflation  rate  to  10% 
per year from zero  produces  an increase  in ,  from e/(e  -  1) =  1.10 to 
1.1044.  Thus,  with  small inflations  or deflations,  the monetary  author- 
ity  cannot  influence  the  average  markup  by  very  much  in  the  NNS 
model. 
7.1.2  Relative-Price  Distortions  from Inflation  If there is no inflation in the 
steady  state, then all relative prices will be one and the end-use  value of 
output  will be maximized.  Further, small changes  in relative prices near 
this initial point will have no effect on the ratio dl/y, so that there will be 
no productivity  effect of small business  cycles or small rates of inflation 
or deflation.  However,  using  a demand  elasticity of E = 11 and 4-quarter 
staggering  of prices  as above,  we  calculate that a 10% annual  inflation 
rate will lower  the end-use  value of output by 0.4% and more generally 
display  the relationship  between  inflation and relative-price distortions 
in panel D of Figure 3.33  Thus, the NNS  framework indicates a quantita- 
tively  important  direct  social  cost  of  sustained  inflation  arising  from 
relative-price distortions. 
Taking these  findings  concerning  the average markup and the size of 
relative-price  distortions  together  with  the  observation  from Section  4 
that there are relatively small gains from reducing inflation from zero to 
the Friedman rule,  the NNS  model  recommends  that the monetary  au- 
thority target a near-zero rate of inflation.  Since the productivity  effects 
of relative-price distortions are minor near zero inflation, in what follows 
we focus solely on movements  in the average markup in considering  the 
response  of the macroeconomy  to various shocks. 
Thus, a case can be made for reducing monopolistic  competition distortions via a 
positive inflation  rate within the NNS approach.  This derivation  is related  to those of 
Benabou  and Konieczny (1994)  in a very different  setup. Goodfriend  (1997)  makes a 
similar  case for positive inflation  in a model in which there  is a "zone  of indeterminacy" 
for the average  markup. 
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7.2 MONETARY  POLICY  AND THE  BUSINESS  CYCLE 
How  should  monetary  policy vary over the course of the business  cycle? 
We argue the objective of the monetary authority should be to produce a 
constant  path for the average markup or, equivalently,  for real marginal 
cost. While markup constancy  is an ad hoc objective, it is attractive to us 
for three related reasons.  First, it brings about the same response  of the 
real economy  to various shocks as would  arise if all prices were perfectly 
flexible. Second,  it corresponds  to tax smoothing  as recommended  in the 
public-finance  literature.34 Finally, it is  consistent  with  the  traditional 
suggested  focus of monetary  policy, which  is to eliminate gaps between 
actual output  and a time-varying  level of potential (capacity) output. 
Our  recommendation  amounts  to  a  neutral monetary  policy  in  the 
sense  that  it  keeps  the  average  markup  at  its  steady-state  level  and 
makes  the  NNS  model  behave  like  a  noncompetitive  RBC economy. 
Neutral monetary policy accommodates  shocks that would alter the equi- 
librium levels  of output  and  employment  with  flexible prices,  such  as 
changes  in  productivity,  fiscal  policy,  and  international  relative  price 
changes,  and some  that would  not,  such as money  demand  shifts. 
7.2.1  Neutral Monetary Policy and Price Dynamics  NNS  price dynamics 
involve  forward-looking  and  backward-looking  components,  as  dis- 
cussed  in the previous  section.  To a first approximation  [as in (5.10)], an 
adjusting  firm sets its price at 
1  J-1 
log Pt  == 
El_i  [  3Jwoj  (Et  log Pt+j  + log (?t+y/b))] 
h=OP  jh  j=0 
To a first approximation  [as in (5.12)], the price level is log Pt = V-1  oj log 
Pt-j. 
Under the neutral-monetary-policy  requirement,  real marginal cost is 
constant  now  and at all future dates,  so that price setting  depends  only 
on  the  expected  future  path  of  the  price  level.  Accordingly,  the  two 
dynamic  equations  imply  an expectational  difference  equation  that can 
be solved  to determine  the price level and inflation implications  of neu- 
tral monetary  policy.  It is  possible  to  produce  a general  mathematical 
solution  to this difference  equation,  but instead,  we look at several spe- 
34. Existing  analyses of dynamically  optimal taxation  in a stochastic  general equilibrium 
setting are supportive  of this assumption.  Notably,  in an economy  with elastic  supply 
of labor  and capital  services, Zhu (1995)  shows that there is little variation  in tax rates 
on either factor.  Ireland (1996a)  is an important  start on studying optimal monetary 
policy in environments  with imperfect  competition  and sticky  prices  that draws on the 
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cial cases  of this  solution  to provide  an intuitive  understanding  of the 
implications  of neutral monetary  policy. 
7.2.2  The Desirability of a Constant Price Level  The benchmark  result is 
that a constant  price level is a neutral monetary policy. That is, if we set 
log Pt = log Pt = log P at all dates in the price equations (5.10) and (5.12), 
then a present  value of real marginal cost must be expected  to be zero at 
all dates, 0 = Et :-J piij/(i_  p3h  (oh)  log(6tf+,/q),  which can only be satisfied 
by a constant level of real marginal cost.35  There are two equivalent ways 
of stating  this conclusion.  Directly, a monetary  authority committed  to 
targeting  a growth  path  for the price level  must  do  so by maintaining 
constant  real marginal cost or equivalently  a constant  average markup. 
Alternatively,  one  can say that a monetary  authority committed  to neu- 
tral policy must target a constant inflation rate. 
7.2.3  The  Money-Supply  Process  Supporting  Neutral Outcomes  Under neu- 
tral monetary  policy,  output  behaves  according  to  a  monopolistically 
competitive  real business  cycle with  a constant  markup ,u in the face of 
shocks to technology,  fiscal policy, and international relative prices. Neu- 
tral policy eliminates  output  gaps,  making Yt  = Yt  at all dates. 
Under  a neutral  policy, the monetary  authority accommodates  varia- 
tions in money  demand  to insure that excesses  or shortages of money  do 
not create aggregate  demand  disturbances.  To work out the implications 
for money  supply, suppose  that the price-level path under neutral policy 
is given  by  log  Pt  =  log  Pt-  +  r,  where  log  Pt is the  log  of the  price  level 
and 7r  is the trend rate of inflation.  Since inflation is constant,  variations 
in  the  real  (r) and  nominal  (R) interest  rate  are  identical  (Rt =  rt  +  'r). 
Then, if the money  demand is log Mt = log Pt -  my  log Yt  -  mRRt  -  vt, the 
money  stock must be 
log  Mt =  log  Pt  -  my log  Yt +  mR(t  +  tr) -  log  vt.  (7.1) 
That  is:  the  monetary  authority  should  accommodate  movements  in 
output  and  interest  rates  obtaining  in  the  RBC model,  and  velocity 
shocks,  too. 
7.2.4  Initial Conditions  and Inflation  Transitions  The optimal pricing equa- 
tions  readily allow  for a characterization of neutral monetary policy un- 
der  more  general  conditions.  Two  decades  ago,  Edmund  Phelps  and 
35. More  generally,  any  price-level  path  with  a constant  inflation  rate at all dates  also 
stabilizes  the  markup.  This  conclusion  is  obtained  by  similar reasoning  and  more 
algebra, together  with  setting 13  =  1. 268 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
Guillermo  Calvo studied  the disinflation  problem in a basic fixed-wage 
model  with  a mathematical  structure similar to (5.10) and  (5.12).36 Two 
key  features  of neutral monetary  policy  carry over to the economics  of 
disinflation.  First, the average  markup must be constant  through  time, 
which  amounts  to requiring that the price adjustment  decision  depend 
only on the expected  future path of the price level: log P* = Et  ---o  (,3i w/ 
El`  p8h Oh)  log Pt+i.  Second,  the path of the price level is just a function of 
the price adjustment  decisions  made at various dates: log Pt =  -0 Co1j  log 
P_j.  When  we  solve  the resulting  expectational  difference  equation  as- 
suming  that the steady-state  inflation rate is zero, the "stable" solution is 
of the form 
J-2 
log P* -  log P*  =  oj(log P*  -  log P_j_l),  (7.2) 
j=l 
where  the coefficients  ou  are functions  of the parameters wo  and  3. That 
is, there is a unique  path of price adjustments  which  must occur if there 
is to be a constant  average markup. 
There  are  a  number  of  implications  of  this  Phelps-Calvo  neutral- 
disinflation  formula. First, neutral monetary policy could equivalently be 
stated as a rule for the growth rate of newly  set prices,  Tit = log P* -  log 
Pt*_.  Second,  given that we have determined the growth rate 'nr necessary 
for a neutral monetary policy, we can use the price-level equation (5.12) to 
determine  the neutral transition path for the measured  rate of inflation, 
Tt =  log  P, -  log  Pt-1 = -J-o X  jt-j. 
In Section 7.1 above we used a 4-quarter Taylor model to get an idea of 
the quantitative  sensitivity  of the average markup to inflation in a steady 
state.  In that model,  it turns out that a neutral transition to Ir =  0 takes 
the form 
<  =  -0.43't-_1  -  0.12<t_2.  (7.3) 
That is,  when  we  begin  in an inflationary steady  state with  a quarterly 
rate of inflation  of, say, 2.5% (so that the annual inflation rate is initially 
10%), then there must be a price decrease on the part of adjusting firms 
36. The results  are reported  in Phelps (1978),  which contains  an appendix  coauthored  with 
Calvo. The appendix to our working paper contains our derivation of the neutral 
monetary  policy under the more  general  conditions  necessary  for the various  scenarios 
discussed in the text. We  thank  Olivier  Blanchard  and Julio  Rotemberg  for  alerting  us to 
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equal  to  -(0.42  +  0.12)  x  0.025  =  -0.01375  in the impact period  of a 
neutral disinflation.  This price decline  is necessary  to stabilize the aver- 
age  markup  given  the  past  price  rises  built  into  the  system,  i.e.,  the 
initial conditions  ir*- =  'Tt2  =  0.025. With this aggressive  policy action, 
the actual inflation  rate  7rt  =4  (tt  +  -fft-l  +  et-2  +  7't-3)  drops  from 2.5% to 
about 1.5% in the impact period of the policy and subsequently  declines 
quickly to zero over the course of one year.37 
7.2.5  Imperfect  Control  of the Price Level  We can also operationalize  neu- 
tral monetary  policy when  the monetary authority has imperfect control 
of  the  price  level.  In  such  a  setting,  the  monetary  authority  cannot 
achieve perfect control of the markup tax, but can keep it from varying in 
expected value. That  is,  its policy rule can make (1/1-o  ph  Wh)  Et-l z1  j 
log(ut+j/iL)  = 0. The preceding  results then apply to the expected compo- 
nent  of monetary  policy, with  an additional  price adjustment  shock  intro- 
duced into the analysis.  That is, with imperfect control of the price level, 
neutral monetary  policy takes the form 
J-2 
7t  =  >  ort-,  + ft,  (7.4) 
j=l 
where  et =  log P:  -  Et-1 log  P*. Thus,  the central bank accommodates 
some  portion of price-level  targeting errors, as in Taylor's analysis. 
7.2.6  Comparison  of Inflation Targets  and Price-Level  Rules  Many  central 
banks pursue inflation targets which allow for base  drift  in the price level. 
In our setting,  a return to a fixed-price-level  path is undesirable,  since it 
requires variations in the average markup. 
We can use the preceding  analysis  to quantify how  much base drift is 
desirable in the setup with 4-quarter staggered price setting given in (7.3). 
Suppose  that incomplete  information  leads  to a targeting error, 6t >  0, 
which  the monetary  authority learns of at the end of the current period. 
How  much of the forecasting error in the price level should  be reversed 
37. The precise form of price stickiness  is important  for the details of neutral  disinflation. 
With  two-period  staggered  price  setting  as in Section  6.3, neutral  monetary  policy  with 
a zero inflation  target  implies lne  = 0 for all periods  after  the disinflation  begins, so that 
the path of the price level is log P = log P* = log P*_  . The inflation  rate in the first 
period  of the policy  is accordingly  7r  =  (0.025),  as one-halfofof  the agents  catch  up to the 
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eventually?38 In the current setup  (7.3), the desirable long-run  effect on 
the price level is simply 
1 t  =  -  ^_0r1--4  -  0.6  6t  1 -  2  o  1-  (-0.43  -  0.12) 
Thus,  the monetary  authority allows about six-tenths of a price forecast- 
ing  error to feed  through  into  the  general  price level  in the  long  run. 
8.  The  Practice  of  Monetary  Policy 
While price stability has long been  suggested  as a primary objective for 
monetary  policy,  a number  of questions  have  arisen about its practical 
desirability  and  feasibility.  This  section  takes  up  four  major concerns 
using  the approach of the New  Neoclassical  Synthesis.  First, the effects 
of oil and  other  commodity  price shocks  have  been  long  discussed  by 
Keynesian  economists  as  a  reason  for  not  stabilizing  the  price  level. 
Second,  Milton  Friedman  and  other  monetarists  have  questioned  the 
desirability  of inflation  targeting on the basis of their reading of mone- 
tary history  and  the  long  and variable lags in the link between  money 
and prices.  Third, New  Keynesians  such as John Taylor have suggested 
the existence  of important  trade-offs between  output  and inflation vari- 
ability. Fourth, central bankers routinely worry about the tactics of using 
their preferred policy instrument,  a short-term interest rate. In address- 
ing  these  issues  below,  we  illustrate how  the new  synthesis  can guide 
the practice of monetary  policy. 
8.1 AN OIL  SHOCK  IN THE  NEW  SYNTHESIS  MODEL 
Oil shocks pose  a difficult problem for monetary policy because they can 
create  inflation  and  unemployment  at  the  same  time.  This  problem, 
however,  makes  oil  shocks  particularly instructive  for illustrating  the 
mechanics  of the NNS  framework and its prescriptive power  for mone- 
tary policy. The analysis  also highlights  the complementarity  of RBC and 
Keynesian  reasoning  that is inherited by NNS models. 
It is natural to think of an oil shock as a restriction in the supply  of oil 
available for use in the production  of final goods.  Firms produce output 
by combining  (after overhead)  capital and labor services  with oil. Since 
firms are monopolistically  competitive,  output  is demand-determined. 
38. We calculate the effect of such a forecasting error on the long-run price level under the 
rule  tr:  =  !J-1  ao-jrt  +  ?t  using  the  same  approach  employed  in  the  literature  on 
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For any level  of final demand,  optimal factor demands  require the mar- 
ginal cost of producing  output for a firm to be the same for an increase in 
any of the three factors of production.  By analogy to (6.4), measured  in 
units of the final-good  aggregate,  optimal use of energy requires that 
aF 
~,t  -  =  pe 
where q is the quantity of energy  (oil) input and p6  is the real price of oil. 
This gives  us two independent  marginal conditions  for the three factors, 
plus the production  function itself that relates the three factor uses to the 
demand-determined  level of output.  A firm chooses  optimal factor uses 
taking factor prices as given.  In general equilibrium, factor prices adjust 
to clear the factor markets,  and, by influencing  the markup, factor-price 
adjustments  also help clear the final-goods  market. 
Since the price level is sticky, output is governed by aggregate demand 
in  the  short  run.  Thus,  we  need  to  take  a  stand  on  how  aggregate 
demand  will behave  in order to say how  the system  responds  to the oil 
shock.  For illustrative  purposes  our  strategy  is  to ask what  aggregate 
demand  policy should  do, and to assume  that monetary policy supports 
that level  of aggregate  demand. 
We benchmark the optimal policy response with RBC  reasoning. By con- 
struction, the standard competitive  RBC  model would respond efficiently 
to the oil shock. For our purposes,  the key feature of the competitive RBC 
model  is that firms price output at the marginal cost of production.  The 
gross markup is always  1 in the standard RBC model.  A necessary condi- 
tion for the NNS  model  to respond  efficiently is that it also maintains a 
constant  markup.  Thus,  the  NNS  recommends  that  monetary  policy 
should aim to stabilize the markup against the oil shock, not accommodat- 
ing any of the oil price rise in higher inflation. 
With  neutral  monetary  policy  in  place,  we  can  ask  how  the  NNS 
model  would  respond  to  the  oil  shock.  At  the  initial  levels  of  factor 
inputs,  output,  and price,  the rise in the price of oil raises the nominal 
marginal cost and hence  cuts the markup. In order for monetary  policy 
to restore the markup to its initial level,  policy must  depress  aggregate 
demand  and cut employment.  From the Keynesian  perspective,  such a 
recommendation  sounds  like adding  insult  to injury-causing  employ- 
ment to fall just when  materials costs are high.  Yet, RBC reasoning  says 
that the economy  should produce less when  the marginal cost of produc- 
tion is temporarily high.  That reasoning  also suggests  that the extent of 
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shock.  A shock expected  to be temporary has little wealth effect on labor 
supply  and consumption  demand.  It mainly raises the opportunity  cost 
of current work relative to leisure and of current leisure relative to future 
leisure.  Thus,  monetary policy should  act to cut aggregate demand  tem- 
porarily to reflect these  opportunity  costs.  The temporary fall in current 
income  in this  case  would  cause  agents  to bid up real interest  rates as 
they attempt to borrow to smooth  consumption.  Importantly, real inter- 
est rates must rise to support neutral monetary policy. 
An  oil  shock  expected  to  be  highly  persistent,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  act like a persistent  negative  productivity  shock,  creating a large 
negative  wealth  effect that would  offset  the substitution  effect on labor 
supply. Relatively little decline in employment  might be called for in this 
case.  But it would  be appropriate  for monetary  policy  to bring about a 
cut in consumption  commensurate  with  the decline in productivity  due 
to the  lack of availability of oil.  The willingness  to cut consumption  as 
income  declines  might produce  little upward pressure  on the real inter- 
est rate. In fact, when  one takes account of the adverse effects on invest- 
ment  and  the  capital  stock  that might  accompany  what  amounts  to a 
highly  persistent  negative  shock  to productivity,  there would  likely be 
downward  pressure  on real interest rates. 
To sum up,  one might reasonably ask why, in practice, oil shocks have 
been  inflationary.  First, to the  extent  that oil products  are produced  in 
competitive  markets and purchased  directly by consumers,  the increase 
in the price of oil gets directly into the price level without being interme- 
diated  by goods-producing  firms in the  sticky-price sector of the econ- 
omy. To stabilize  the price level  against these  direct price shocks would 
require  pursuing  aggregate  demand  policy  restrictive enough  to push 
demand  and employment  down  in the sticky-price sector, thus increas- 
ing  the  markup there.  NNS  reasoning  does  not recommend  increasing 
the markup in the sticky-price  sector to stabilize the overall price level. 
Policy should  be accommodative  of such direct price shocks,  especially 
since  they  are relative-price  shocks  whose  effect on inflation  is tempo- 
rary. Second,  and equally important, central banks can be reluctant to let 
real interest rates rise sharply, especially when  a cost shock is hurting the 
economy.  The inflationary consequences  of oil price shocks have proba- 
bly been  exacerbated by central-bank attempts to smooth  nominal inter- 
est rates with  overly expansionary  money  growth. 
8.2 IS INFLATION  TARGETING  PRACTICAL? 
Monetary economists  have long thought  that price stability has much to 
recommend  it as the  primary goal  for monetary  policy, and  recently  a 
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guide  for policy.39 It has been  less  clear, however,  that inflation  targets 
could play a useful  role as an immediate  policy objective and a criterion 
for performance.  Using  the  NNS,  we  review  practical arguments  that 
have  been  advanced  against inflation  targeting by Friedman (1960) and 
others.  We argue that these  objections are unduly  pessimistic  when  one 
recognizes  the role of sticky prices and central-bank credibility in price 
setting. 
8.2.1  Interpreting  Historical  Experience  Friedman's view is based in large 
part on his work on the monetary history of the United States with Anna 
Schwartz, in which  they found lags in the effect of monetary policy to be 
long and variable, ranging between  half a year to over two years. Reason- 
ing on the basis of the historical data, Friedman observed  that "the price 
level  . . . could be an effective  guide  only if it were  possible  to predict, 
first, the nonmonetary  effects on the price level for a considerable period 
of time in the future,  and second,  the length  of time it will take in each 
particular instance  for monetary  actions  to  have  their effect...."  He 
concluded  that  "...  the  link  between  price  changes  and  monetary 
changes  over  short  periods  is too  loose  and too imperfectly  known  to 
make  price  level  stability  an  objective  and  reasonably  unambiguous 
guide  to policy."40 
Friedman's inference about the advisability of inflation targeting seems 
too pessimistic.  In the first place,  none  of the data from U.S.  monetary 
history were drawn from a policy regime guided by the purposeful  pur- 
suit of price stability. The gold standard prior to World War I was one in 
which  trend  inflation  was  small by  today's  standards.  But the  United 
States had no central bank, and money growth was heavily influenced by 
banking panics on a number of occasions,  and by gold flows governed by 
the balance  of payments  and the happenstance  of new  discoveries  and 
mining  techniques.  As  a consequence,  short-run  price-level  variability 
was quite significant  at times during the period.41 
After  the  founding  of  Federal  Reserve  there  was  inflation  during 
World War I followed  by  a sharp  deflation  after the  war; then  prices 
stabilized in the 1920s, and the price level fell by around one-third from 
1929 to 1933. The World War II inflation was not reversed  subsequently, 
and  instead  the  nation  entered  a period  in which  the price level  more 
than tripled in the three decades  following  the Korean War. 
NNS  models  imply  that the  linkages  between  prices and output  de- 
pend  sensitively  on the monetary  regime.  Since U.S.  monetary  history 
39. See Haldane  (1995) and Leiderman and Svensson  (1995). 
40. Friedman (1960, pp.  87-88). 
41. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer and Robinson (1989). 274 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
has  been  a  succession  of  very  different  monetary  regimes,  the  NNS 
would  predict just the kind of apparent instability in the effect of money 
found by Friedman and Schwartz. Robert Gordon's findings,  mentioned 
in  Section  5.1,  of  radically  different  empirical  price  equations  across 
different sample  periods  are a manifestation  of the same kind of regime- 
dependent  instability. 
8.2.2  The Role of Credibility  If inferences  from  historical  data  can  be 
misleading,  we can make some conjectures about low-inflation  targeting 
in  the  NNS  model  based  on  the  role of central-bank credibility in the 
price-setting  process.  According  to (5.10), for instance,  costly price set- 
ting implies  that firms care about a distributed lead of the price level and 
real marginal  cost  in setting  today's  price.  When an inflation-targeting 
regime  is  perfectly  credible,  fixed  distributed  leads  of both  prices  and 
real marginal cost (the reciprical of markup) anchor current price-setting 
behavior.42 Add  to  that some  staggering  of price setting,  and  the  pre- 
sumption  is that credibility for low inflation is apt to be self-enforcing  to 
a large  extent,  because  in  such  an  environment,  firms will  think  less 
about inflation  and be less  nervous  about it. This confidence  would  be 
reinforced further by a legislative  mandate making low inflation a prior- 
ity for monetary  policy. 
The  main  question  for a central bank  committed  to low  inflation  is 
how  "forgiving" price setters are likely to be of policy mistakes.  Mistakes 
will  inevitably  occur due  to imperfect  information  about the  economy. 
But such  mistakes  would  have  little effect  if caught  in  time,  precisely 
because  of the  sluggishness  in price setting.  Of course,  a central bank 
that  allowed  mistakes  to  cumulate  for  some  reason,  so  that  inflation 
began to move  significantly higher, could turn the distributed lead in the 
price  equation  from  a stabilizing  anchor  into  a source  of  destabilizing 
inflation scares.43 
Inflation  scares  are easy  to  understand  from  the  perspective  of  the 
new  synthesis.  A central bank has an incentive  to cheat on its commit- 
ment  to  price  stability  in  the  NNS  model  because  a  monetary  policy 
action  can  reduce  the  markup  distortion  and  increase  employment. 
Chari, Kehoe,  and Prescott (1989), for instance,  might argue that a cen- 
tral bank without  a precommitment  technology  could not sustain a low- 
inflation equilibrium at all. At a minimum,  their argument suggests  that 
42. Ball  (1995)  contrasts  credible  and  incredible  disinflations  in  settings  with  forward- 
looking  price setting. 
43. Goodfriend  (1993) documents  a number of inflation scares in the 1979-1992 period and 
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the incentive  to cheat makes  price setters hypersensitive  to policy  mis- 
takes in a way  that makes a low-inflation  equilibrium extremely  fragile. 
It seems  to  us  that  NNS  reasoning  coupled  with  recent  monetary 
policy developments  weakens  considerably the force of such a point.  We 
think that central banks such as the Federal Reserve today largely inter- 
nalize  the  long-run  costs  of cheating.  As  a result  of the  Volcker Fed's 
taking responsibility  for inflation in the late 1970s and successfully  bring- 
ing it down,  the Fed is now  widely  held to be responsible  for inflation.44 
Moreover,  the  low-inflation  experience  since  then  has  demonstrated 
clearly the long-run benefits of price stability. Hence,  we believe that the 
temptation  for the Fed to cheat on its low-inflation  commitment  is much 
weaker  than in the past. 
8.3 INFLATION  AND OUTPUT  VARIABILITY 
Although  his  staggered-overlapping-contract  model  exhibits  no  long- 
run  trade-off  in  the  level  of  inflation  and  the  level  of  output,  Taylor 
(1980) showed  that  it does  imply  a trade-off between  the  variance  of 
output  and  the  variance  of inflation.  On this basis,  Taylor argued  that 
business  cycles can be reduced only by accepting increased variability of 
inflation. 
Since NNS models  embody  the kind of price-setting behavior assumed 
by Taylor, the question  arises whether  such models  also present  policy- 
makers  with  a difficult choice  between  inflation and output  variability. 
The question  is of more than academic interest,  since it bears on one of 
the  most  important  issues  in  central banking  today:  the  design  of  a 
legislative  mandate  for monetary  policy. Most experts  agree that some 
form of clear mandate would  improve the effectiveness  of policy by tying 
down  inflation  expectations  and increasing  central-bank accountability. 
The new  synthesis  supports  such reasoning.  But there is no agreement 
on  whether  a trade-off  exists  or if it does,  on  how  to allow  for it in a 
mandate. 
8.3.1  Is There  a Trade-off? Recall our principle  that monetary  policy  in 
NNS  models  should  aim to keep  the markup constant  at the low  level 
consistent  with near-zero inflation.  Thus, monetary policy should  offset 
44. The Fed did not explicitly  assert  its responsibility  for  inflation  in the initial  October  1979 
announcements  of its disinflationary  policy.  However,  by emphasizing  the role played 
by money growth in the inflation  process, and by announcing  a change in operating 
procedures  to control  money,  in effect, the Fed implicitly  acknowledged  its responsibil- 
ity for inflation.  Today,  central  banks  are  widely understood  by the public  to be respon- 
sible for inflation. 276 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
shocks  to aggregate  demand.  Such policy actions would  not only keep 
output at potential but stabilize prices as well.  On the other hand, mone- 
tary policy  should  accommodate  productivity  shocks,  taking  into  ac- 
count any associated  effects on labor supply and the capital stock. Other- 
wise,  an output  gap would  open  that would  cause  the markup to vary. 
There is no trade-off in either of these cases-policy  should stabilize both 
the  markup  and  prices  in response  to demand  or productivity  shocks. 
Even for an oil shock, society clearly faces no trade-off if oil is an interme- 
diate  input.  We saw  above  that the  best  outcome  is  to maintain  price 
stability and to reduce demand in response  to the decline in productivity. 
What about a NNS model with a flexible-price goods-producing  sector 
alongside  the sticky-price monopolistically  competitive  sector, in which 
shocks  could  impact  inflation  directly?  Clearly,  such  a  modification 
would  not change  the conclusion  with  respect to aggregate  demand  or 
productivity  shocks,  since these  should  still be offset or accommodated, 
respectively. 
The added price flexibility, however,  complicates the response  to an oil 
shock,  because  the restriction in the supply  of oil causes  the oil price to 
rise relative to other prices. If policy were to depress  aggregate  demand 
just  enough  to  maintain  stable  prices  in  the  sticky-price  sector,  oil- 
intensive  product  prices in the flexible-price sector would  still rise. The 
central  bank  could  reduce  aggregate  demand  enough  to  prevent  the 
overall  price  level  (flexible  plus  sticky  prices)  from rising,  but  then  it 
would  raise  the  markup  and  create an  output  gap  in  the  sticky-price 
sector. 
Thus,  policy  would  appear  to face a trade-off between  inflation  and 
output  variability with  respect  to relative-price  shocks.  But even  here, 
NNS reasoning  provides a way out. Practically speaking, the new synthe- 
sis suggests  that a central bank should  aim to stabilize an index of sticky 
prices alone,  a core price index.  This view accords well with the Keynes- 
ian emphasis  on  a core rather than an overall cost-of-living  index,  and 
the monetarist  recommendation  to stabilize a long-run index and ignore 
such  relative price movements  as oil price shocks.  When  we  define  the 
measure  of prices that a central bank should  stabilize as a core index of 
sticky prices, we once again find that there is no policy trade-off between 
inflation and output  variability. 
8.3.2  The Design of a Legislative  Mandate  for Monetary  Policy  What, then, 
are the implications  of the new  synthesis  for the design  of a legislative 
mandate  for monetary  policy? First, there is no policy trade-off between 
inflation  and  output  variability if the  targeted  measure  of inflation  is a 
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firms. Second,  a central bank should  seek to keep output at its potential 
by targeting the minimum  markup consistent  with near-zero core infla- 
tion.  Third,  according  to  the  analysis  in  Section  7.2,  a  central  bank 
should  partially accommodate  core-price-level  targeting mistakes  in or- 
der to keep output  at its potential. 
8.4 TACTICAL  POLICY  IMPLEMENTATION 
The new  synthesis  suggests  that a central bank must pursue  an activist 
policy to target inflation.  There are great difficulties in implementing  an 
activist policy  rule, many of them well known  and long debated among 
monetary  economists  and  central  bankers,  some  of  which  were  ad- 
dressed  above.  Our purpose  in this section  is to make a few additional 
points  suggested  by the new  synthesis  for thinking  about the practical 
implementation  of policy. 
8.4.1  Interest-Rate  Policy  Central banks invariably use a short-term inter- 
est rate as their monetary policy instrument.  The new synthesis  says that 
central bankers should  manage a low-inflation  targeting regime by mak- 
ing the short-term nominal  rate mimic the real short rate that would  be 
ground out by a well-specified  RBC model with a low, constant markup. 
RBC reasoning  is  indispensable  for thinking  about  how  much  and  in 
what direction the real rate should be moved  in response  to a shock. For 
instance,  even  the  direction  of the  appropriate  real-rate response  to a 
productivity  shock  depends  on  the  expected  duration  of the  shock,  as 
we  saw above when  we  discussed  the oil shock. 
As  another  example  of  the  value  of  RBC reasoning,  consider  this. 
Recently,  a possible  pickup  in productivity  growth  has been  cited as a 
reason  why  the Federal Reserve  need  not raise short-term real interest 
rates to maintain low  inflation.  In fact, the standard RBC component  of 
the NNS  model  suggests,  at a minimum,  that real rates would  have  to 
rise one for one with an increase in trend productivity growth,  e.g.,  a 50- 
basis-point  increase in the growth  rate would  be matched by a 50-basis- 
point  increase  in real interest  rates.45 Importantly, rates would  have  to 
rise even  if the economy  were  otherwise  operating at a noninflationary 
potential  level  of GDP. 
Generally  speaking,  central-bank management  of the short-term real 
interest  rate is difficult for the  following  reason.  Although  the current 
output  gap  may  move  relatively  closely  and  monotonically  with  the 
45. This is the case  across steady  states when  utility is logarithmic.  Rates would  have  to 
rise even more if consumption  were less substitutable intertemporally than logarithmic 
utility  suggests.  Moreover,  this  calculation  does  not allow  for the  transitory upward 
pressure  on real rates due to an accompanying  investment  boom. 278 *  GOODFRIEND  & KING 
current markup in NNS  models,  the  real interest  rate and the markup 
are not  closely  related.  Real interest  rates rise and  fall in response  to 
various shocks in the RBC model,  even though  there is no markup at all. 
The real interest  rate adjusts  to equate  saving  and investment.  At any 
point  in  time,  the  current  real rate  (and  also  the  expected  future  se- 
quence  of real rates) needed  to support a constant markup, will depend 
in a complex  way on the nature and magnitude  of current shocks hitting 
the economy  and their expected  duration. 
8.4.2  Inflation Indicators  NNS  reasoning  suggests  that familiar indica- 
tors  of  rising  inflation  will  be  less  effective  in  a  fully  credible  low- 
inflation-targeting  regime.  For instance,  rapid inventory  stockbuilding 
and lengthening  delivery  lags warned  of inflation in the past.  From the 
perspective  of NNS  models,  precautionary or speculative  stockbuilding 
was  rational  precisely  because  monetary  policy  would  fail to  restrain 
aggregate demand  before it pressed  against capacity and raised expected 
real marginal cost sufficiently  to cause firms to pursue inflationary price 
increases.  In  such  circumstances,  rising  inflation  expectations  would 
rationally be incorporated into long-term interest rates as well, and bond 
rates could also warn of future inflation. 
In contrast,  if a central bank  consistently  controlled  inflation,  firms 
would  be less  likely  to build  up  inventories  or place precautionary  ad- 
vance orders when  the economy  neared full employment.  Expected infla- 
tion would  not raise bond rates. Bond rates would  rise in cyclical expan- 
sions  only  because  they  embodied  increases  in  future  short-term  real 
interest rates expected  to be brought about by the central bank. In a fully 
credible  low-inflation-targeting  regime,  a central bank  would  have  to 
become  more sensitive  to familiar indicators than in the past, and would 
likely  need  to  develop  additional  indicators  to  guide  its  interest-rate 
policy actions. 
9.  Summary  and Conclusions 
The models  of the  New  Neoclassical  Synthesis  are complex  since  they 
involve  intertemporal  optimization,  rational expectations,  monopolistic 
competition,  costly  price adjustment  and dynamic price setting,  and an 
important  role  for monetary  policy.  Our  main  purposes  in  the  paper 
were threefold: to motivate  the separate components  of the new synthe- 
sis,  to present  a conceptual  framework for thinking about NNS  models, 
and  to  use  that  apparatus  to  develop  recommendations  for monetary 
policy. 
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Keynesian  and  RBC mechanisms  can be  viewed  as operating  through 
somewhat  different  channels.  Holding  the  average  markup  constant, 
NNS  model  mechanics  resemble  those  of a pure, albeit noncompetitive, 
RBC model.  On  the  other hand,  the Keynesian  influence  of aggregate 
demand  on  employment  and  output  works  by shrinking  or increasing 
the markup, which  acts like a distorting tax on economic  activity. 
Second,  dynamic  costly  price  adjustment  means  that  firms  adjust 
price according to an expected  distributed lead of the price level and real 
marginal cost,  where  the price level  is an average of current prices and 
those  set in the past.  We showed  that the forward-looking  price-setting 
equation  and  a  price-level  expression  form  a  price  block  that  can  be 
solved  to express  the inflation rate as a function of prices set in the past, 
current real marginal cost,  and a distributed lead of expected  real mar- 
ginal  cost.  Since  real marginal  cost  is  the  inverse  of  the  markup,  the 
evolution  of inflation in the NNS model depends  importantly on current 
and expected  future markups. 
The recommended  neutral monetary  policy in the new  synthesis  fol- 
lows  directly  from  the  above  insights  and  the  idea  that  the  markup 
ought  to  be  held  constant.  Markup  constancy  is  attractive because  it 
delivers  the  same  response  of  the  real economy  to  various  shocks  as 
would  arise  if  all  prices  were  perfectly  flexible.  We  showed  that  the 
steady-state  markup  should  be minimized  at a near-zero inflation  rate, 
and argued  that most  of the benefits  for monetary  exchange  would  be 
realized  at near-zero  inflation  as well.  Thus,  we  found  that near-zero 
inflation  targeting  was  both  desirable  and  feasible  in the  NNS  model. 
Even though  the new  synthesis  inherits much of the spirit of the old, it 
differs sharply in terms of the role of monetary policy. Economists work- 
ing  within  the  synthesis  of  the  1960s  were  pessimistic  about  taming 
inflation,  viewing  inflation as having a momentum  of its own and fluctu- 
ating with  unmanageable  shifts in the psychology  of price setters.  The 
new  synthesis  also views  expectations  as critical to the inflation process, 
but sees  expectations  as amenable to management  by a monetary policy 
rule. 
The new  synthesis  has  much  to say about the practical implementa- 
tion of inflation targets. Since expectations  of future markups play a key 
role  in  the  inflation-generating  process,  successful  inflation  targeting 
requires a credible commitment  to low inflation,  so that expectations  of 
markup constancy  anchor the inflation-generating  equation.  In order to 
maintain markup constancy, monetary policy must accommodate  move- 
ments  in potential  GDP brought about by RBC forces such as productiv- 
ity, fiscal policy, or materials cost shocks.  Accommodation  must be two- 
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money  demand.  Second,  the monetary authority must move its nominal 
short-term  interest-rate  instrument  to support  real short-term interest- 
rate movements  called for by underlying  RBC forces. Ironically, in spite 
of the fact that Keynesian  effects of monetary  policy on real activity are 
powerful  in  NNS  models,  monetary  policy  is best  when  it eliminates 
Keynesian  effects entirely. 
Researchers have merely scratched the surface in thinking about NNS 
models:  such  models  will  surely  be  elaborated  and  improved  in  the 
future. Looking backward: NNS models should improve our understand- 
ing  of  macroeconomic  outcomes  during  volatile  inflationary  periods, 
such  as  that  extending  from  the  mid-1960s  through  the  early  1980s, 
when  both large monetary  policy  shocks  and large supply  shocks were 
important.  Moreover,  the division  of the effect of an increase in money 
growth  between  inflation and output in the NNS  model  depends  sensi- 
tively  on  the  extent  to  which  the  faster money  growth  is  expected  to 
persist.  Thus,  NNS  models  should  help us understand  the time-varying 
effect  of money  on  prices  and  output  that characterizes historical time 
series. Looking forward: as the United States and other countries around 
the  world  maintain  low  inflation,  supply-side  forces  should  loom  as 
large as demand-side  forces for the business  cycle. We expect NNS mod- 
els  to become  increasingly  important in providing  monetary  policy  ad- 
vice in such an environment. 
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Comment 
ELLEN  McGRATTAN 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis* 
Goodfriend  and  King  provide  an  interesting  historical  account  of  the 
intellectual  debates  concerning  the theory and practice of monetary pol- 
icy. Their review  of historical thought  leads them to conclude  that there 
is much less intellectual  disarray amongst  modem-day  macroeconomists 
than many  perceive.  According  to Goodfriend  and King, we  are united 
on  methodological  grounds  and  on  substantive  issues.  This is indeed 
good  news. 
There  is  a label  for this  united  front.  According  to  Goodfriend  and 
King,  macroeconomics  is  moving  toward  a  New Neoclassical Synthesis 
(NNS).  This label could be ascribed to models or to an approach. The key 
elements  are (1) intertemporal optimization,  (2) rational expectations,  (3) 
imperfect competition,  and (4) costly price adjustment. 
In terms of the methodological  basis of the NNS,  I would  agree with 
the  view  that  most  of  us  are now  on  common  ground-introducing 
micro foundations  into our models  of the macroeconomy  and assuming 
individuals  and  firms  solve  intertemporal  optimization  problems.  In 
terms  of  substantive  economic  issues,  however,  Goodfriend  and  King 
are perhaps  pushing  unanimity  too  hard.  The  implications  that  they 
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imperfect competition,  and (4) costly price adjustment. 
In terms of the methodological  basis of the NNS,  I would  agree with 
the  view  that  most  of  us  are now  on  common  ground-introducing 
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attribute  to  the  NNS  are (i) that  monetary  policy  can  have  large and 
persistent  effects,  (ii)  that  there  is  no  long-run  inflation  and  output 
tradeoff,  (iii) that the  welfare  costs  of inflation  are significant,  (iv) that 
credibility  plays  an  important  role,  and  (v)  that  monetary  authorities 
should  be pursuing  a policy  of inflation  targeting.  In my view,  conclu- 
sions  (i), (iii), and (v) are controversial even  for those who  have worked 
with models  in the NNS class. Using a standard NNS model,  I will argue 
that monetary  policy  does  not have  persistent  effects and that the wel- 
fare costs  of inflation  are not significant.  The recommendation  that the 
monetary authorities should be pursuing a policy of inflation targeting is 
controversial  only  because  it has not been  shown-either  in this paper 
or elsewhere-that  optimal monetary  policy implies  targeting inflation. 
I would  like  to  consider  these  issues  with  the  aid  of a prototypical 
NNS  model  that  I  have  analyzed  in  Chari,  Kehoe,  and  McGrattan 
(1996).1 This  model  has  all of  the  elements  that Goodfriend  and  King 
require to be included  in the category of NNS  models. 
Assume  that  there  are three  types  of economic  agents-final-goods 
producers,  intermediate-goods  producers,  and  consumers.  The  final- 
goods  producers  solve a simple static profit maximization problem. They 
buy  differentiated  products-indexed  by i here-and  behave  competi- 
tively. The maximization  problem that they solve is given by 
max P-  di  subject to  di = 1,  (1) 
yE  y  y 
where  P  is the price of the final good  and pi is the price of intermediate 
good  i.  From this  problem,  we  can back out  a downward-sloping  de- 
mand function  (y') and the aggregate price level (P). 
The intermediate  goods  producer sets a price for N periods.  I assume 
that there are N different types  of producers.  The first group of produc- 
ers set their price this period before seeing  the current monetary  shock 
and  hold  it fixed  for N periods.  The  second  group  set their price next 
period  and hold it fixed for N periods,  and so on. This setup is like that 
of  Taylor's  (1980) staggered  contracting  framework.  The  optimization 
problem  solved  by  those  producers  who  can change  their price in the 




EQ(sTlst-1)[Pi  -  P(S-l)(s)yi 
P'  T=t  S 
1. In essence, this model is a dynamic version of the model in Blanchard  and Kiyotaki 
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where  st is the history of shocks up to and including  period t, Q(slst-)  is 
the price of one dollar in state s' in units of dollars at s"t-, I(st) is the unit 
cost of production  at st, and yi(st)  is the solution of (1) when  P(st-l) is the 
price of the final good.  The technology  for producing intermediate goods 
is given  by 
yi(st) = F[kt(st), i(st)], 
where  F is a constant-returns-to-scale  production  function,  and the unit 
cost of production  is given by 
(st) =  min r(st)k  + w(st)e  subject to  F(k, e) >  1, 
k,e 
where  r(st) is the rental rate of capital and w(st) is the real wage  rate. 
The  consumers  choose  rules  for  consumption  c,  labor e,  capital  k, 
nominal  money  balances  M,  and  bond  holdings  B to  maximize  their 
utility given  by 
;  2  St'(t)U(c(st)'  e(st),  m(st)) 
t=O  st 
subject to the following  sequence  of budget  constraints: 
P(st-')[c(st)  +  k(st)] +  M(st)  +E  Q(st+llst)B(st+l) 
P(st-1){w(st)e(st) +  [r(st) +  1 -  ]k(st-1)}  + M(st-) 
+ B(st) + H(st) +  T(st),  t = 0, 1, 2,  ... 
where  7T(st)  is  the  probability  of  history  st, m(st) =  M(st)/P(st-l) is  real 
balances,  H(st) is nominal  profits of the intermediate  goods  producers, 
and T(st)  is nominal  transfers. 
In addition,  I assume  that factor markets clear, i.e., 
k(st-1)  = 
-k(st) 
di ?(st) =  '(s)  di, 
that the following  economy  wide  resource constraint holds 
c(st) + k(st) -  (1 -  S)k(s'-1)  = y(st) 286 *  McGRATTAN 
and that the nominal  money  supply  process is given by 
M(st)  =  ,(st)M(t-1),  (2) 
where  /,  is  a  stochastic  process  and  new  money  balances  are lump- 
sum transfers to consumers.  With these  additional constraints,  I have a 
fully  specified  dynamic  model  with  intertemporal  optimization,  sticky 
prices,  imperfect  competition,  and-I  will  assume-expectations  that 
are rational. 
Suppose  that we  compute  an equilibrium for the above economy  with 
parameters  chosen  to replicate features of U.S.  time series.2 The model 
can then  be  simulated,  and  we  can investigate  Goodfriend  and  King's 
claim that monetary  policy can have large and persistent  effects. 
I find that to get the variability in output to match that of the data, it is 
necessary  to  multiply  the  estimated  standard  deviation  of  the  distur- 
bance  to  money  growth  by {.  In  other  words,  the  impact  effect  of  a 
monetary  shock is very large. However,  the model  generates  almost no 
persistence  in  output  beyond  the  contract period.  Once  all firms  are 
allowed  to change  prices,  output  is back to its steady-state  level.  If I use 
an interest-rate rule like that analyzed  by Taylor (1993) rather than (2), I 
get  the  same  type  of  results.  Now,  you  can  change  the  persistence 
results-however,  all of the ways that I know to do it rely on implausible 
parameterizations  of the model.  So, can we  say that "NNS models  sug- 
gest  that monetary  policy  actions  can have  an important  effect on real 
economic  activity, persisting  over several years"? 
One  might  also ask about other predictions  of the NNS  models.  Pre- 
sumably, if we are going to use these models  for welfare calculations and 
policy  simulations,  we  would  like  to  feel  that they  fit the  facts'along 
certain  key  dimensions.  My  biggest  concern  here  is  that  the  nominal 
variables and the correlations of nominal  and real variables do not look 
that similar in the model  and data. For example,  although  the variability 
in consumption,  investment,  and output  agrees well,  the nominal  vari- 
ables  are  too  smooth,  hours  are  too  volatile,  and  the  correlation  of 
money  growth  today  and output  in the future is negative,  not positive. 
What about the welfare costs of inflation? Goodfriend and King claim 
that they are significant.  They use estimates of Lucas (1993) and Wolman 
(1996) as a benchmark.  For a shopping-time  model,  Lucas estimates  the 
2. Chari, Kehoe,  and McGrattan (1996) choose  U(c, ?, m) = {[bc"  +  (1 -  b)mjlv(1  -  t)}l-"/ 
(1 -  a) with b =  0.73,  v =  -17.52,  =  = 3, and  or  = 5; F(k, e) = kel-a  with  a = 0.33,  8 = 
1  1  1 
1 -  0.94,  =  0.964, 6 =  0.9; and the following  process  for k: In  L,,,  =  0.43 ln(1.064) + 
0.57 In jt + 0.00193e,,+  with e, ~ N(0, 1). These parameter  values are  used for simulating 
the model and below for the welfare  calculations. Comment  287 
percentage  income  compensation  needed  to leave  households  indiffer- 
ent between  a nominal  interest rate of 6% and 0% to be 1%. (A nominal 
interest  rate of 6% is consistent  with  a 5% inflation rate if the discount 
rate is  approximately  1%.) Wolman  (1996) considers  a variation  of the 
shopping-time  model  which  includes  a satiation level  of cash balances. 
He finds  that going  from 7% to 0% inflation implies  a 1% welfare cost. 
Since  neither  Lucas's  (1993) nor Wolman's  (1996) model  falls in the 
NNS category, I will redo the calculations with the NNS model described 
above.  Let me start with the benchmark parameterization that I used  for 
the model  simulations.  Also  let me take as a benchmark Taylor's (1980) 
preferred choice of staggered  contracts. That is, assume  that choices are 
made  each quarter and that firms keep prices fixed for one year. In this 
case,  I of  the  firms  set  prices  in January, 
1 in  April, 4  in July, and  i  in 
October. Denote  (c,  ,  mi) as the high-inflation  (5%) steady state and (c, 
[,  mr)  as the low-inflation  (0%) steady  state. The cost I am computing  is 
A, where 
U(c(1  +  A),  ,  m)  =  U(c,  (,  m). 
Thus,  A is  the  compensation  needed  to  leave  households  indifferent 
between  an inflation rate of 5% and a rate of 0%. In the benchmark case, 
this cost is approximately?%. 
One problem with taking this number seriously is that in the inflation- 
ary steady  state,  firms are holding  their price fixed for one  year rather 
than keeping  the rate of price increases  fixed.  Suppose,  therefore,  that 
we  set  N  =  1,  so  that  all monopolists  set  prices  simultaneously,  and 
prices  are sticky  for only  one  quarter. The welfare  cost  in  this  case  is 
approximately  %. 
Of course,  a crucial parameter here is the size of the markup, which in 
the steady state is given by 1/0. In the benchmark case, I had 0 = 0.9 and 
hence  a markup  of  11%. Suppose  I come  closer to perfect competition 
and choose  6 = 0.99 and therefore a markup of 1%. With N =  1 and 0 = 
0.99,  the  welfare  cost  is approximately  %. Thus,  the range of welfare 
costs A for these  three experiments  is from 1%  to 1%.  I am not sure that I 
would  conclude  that welfare costs in this range are significant.3 
The final implication  of the NNS models  that I would  like to discuss  is 
inflation  targeting  as an optimal policy. Goodfriend  and King make the 
case that NNS models  suggest  that the optimal monetary policy involves 
low  inflation  with  price-level  stability. They  motivate  this  as  follows. 
3. If I redo these calculations for the case of reducing inflation from 7% to 0% as in Wolman 
(1996), then I find a cost of 0.73% if N = 4, 0.47% if N = 1, and 0.35% if N = 1 and 0 = 0.99. 288 *  McGRATTAN 
First, note  that solving  the  cost minimization  for the firms yields  first- 
order  conditions  such  as wt =  tFe(kt, ft).  A similar  condition  holds  for the 
rental  rate  on  capital.  The  real  unit  cost  t,  is  just  1 divided  by  the 
markup.  The average  markup,  therefore,  acts like an income  tax in an 
RBC model.  This is a useful analogy. Now consider the optimal-tax litera- 
ture. For example,  Chari, Christiano,  and Kehoe (1994) show  that there 
is little variability in the optimal  tax rates on variable factors of produc- 
tion.  But if the markups  (or costs)  are constant,  then prices will simply 
grow at some fixed rate. This is easy to see from the pricing equation that 
is derived  from the intermediate  goods  producer's problem. 
However,  this motivation  for price-level  stability is just that, motiva- 
tion. Many assumptions  underlie it. For example,  Chari, Christiano, and 
Kehoe's  (1994) results  are numerical,  not  theoretical.  It is  not  known 
what  assumptions  are critical, if any. Another  concern is markups that 
are time varying  for reasons  other than actions on the part of the mone- 
tary authority. My question,  therefore, is "why not work out the optimal 
policy?" If it turns out that in fact price-level stability is the right sugges- 
tion, that is only step one.  There are many problems with implementing 
such  a policy.  Goodfriend  and  King discuss  these  problems  but  don't 
resolve  them. 
To summarize,  the  statements  that the effects of monetary  policy  are 
persistent  and  the  welfare  costs  of inflation  are significant  depend  in 
important ways  on particular parameters and certain modeling  choices. 
The recommendation  for inflation targeting may well be a sensible  one, 
but this needs  to be worked  out. 
Since  I am  pleased  to  hear  that  macroeconomists  are no  longer  in 
disarray, I hope  that I am the only one who finds Goodfriend and King's 
conclusions  controversial. 
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1. Introduction 
Marvin Goodfriend  and Robert King (GK in what follows) have written a 
very useful  paper. Their review  of the recent history of macroeconomic 
thought  will help  outsiders  to the field.  The model  they construct,  and 
its lineage,  are both clearly articulated. And  the potential usefulness  of 
the model  is shown  through  a series of applications  to monetary policy. 
I shall focus  my  comments  on  three issues.  The first is on the  "new 
synthesis"  in general.  The second  is on the specific GK model.  The third 
is on the desirability of inflation targeting. 
2.  The  New Synthesis 
What makes thinking about short-run fluctuations so difficult is the need 
to use at least three ingredients. 
Intertemporal  optimization. There is little question  that,  in deciding  how 
much to consume,  consumers  think not only about current income but 
also about future income;  that in deciding  how  much to invest,  firms 
think not  only  about current but also future profitability; and so on. 
Nominal rigidities. Macroeconomics  would  be  easier  and  more  elegant 
without  nominal  rigidities.  Unfortunately, they do exist. For the same 
reasons  people  find it convenient  to use a numeraire, they also find it 
convenient  to set prices in terms of this numeraire, and not to change 
their prices  all the  time.  Put another  way,  the  price level  is not  the 
asset price of the Sidrauski model,  but a sum of very many individual 
prices,  each of them  set for some  period  of time; this fact drastically 
changes  price-level  dynamics. 
Imperfect  competition.  That goods,  labor, and credit markets are not per- 
fectly competitive  is nearly self-evident.  That these  imperfections  are 
central to macroeconomics  is more controversial,  but not much.  The 
role  of cash  flow-as  distinct  from profitability-on  investment  dy- 
namics is now  well established.  It is hard to make sense  of the behav- 
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ior of the real wage  in the labor market within a standard competitive 
model.  And so on. 
Putting  these  ingredients  together  and  understanding  their interac- 
tions is hard.  But this is what we-the  macroeconomists-all  try to do. 
This is  what  the  "neoclassical  synthesis"  was  about.  In rather schizo- 
phrenic fashion,  intertemporal optimization was at the core of the formal- 
ization  of consumption  and investment,  imperfect competition  the un- 
derlying  rationale for markup pricing,  and nominal  rigidities used  as a 
general justification  for the Phillips curve.  Since then,  we  have  tried to 
improve  on the shortcomings.  But the goal is the same. 
We differ in the relative weights  we  put on the different ingredients, 
as well as on the shortcuts we are willing to make. Think of a triangle. At 
the  top  is  the  Ramsey-Prescott  model,  with  its  emphasis  on  inter- 
temporal choice.  At the bottom left is the Taylor model,  with its empha- 
sis  on  nominal  rigidities.  At  the  bottom  right  is  the  Akerlof-Yellen 
model,  with  its focus  on imperfections  in the goods  and the labor mar- 
kets.  Most of us live  somewhere  in the triangle.  So do Goodfriend  and 
King. Seen in this light,  "new" and "synthesis" may both be a bit of an 
overstatement. 
3.  The  Goodfriend-King  Incarnation 
The specific model  written down  by GK is given by equations  (5.10) and 
(5.11). At first glance,  it looks like the Taylor model.  At second  glance, it 
still  does,  except  for  the  fact  that  the  weights  on  past  and  expected 
variables are not quite the same.  The more important contribution how- 
ever is that the equations  are derived,  up to a loglinearization,  from an 
explicit maximization  problem; this is not of much value by itself, but it 
allows  one  to think about  a richer set of welfare  implications.  Witness 
the discussion  of the costs of inflation in the GK paper, an exercise which 
could not be carried out in the Taylor model. 
In their interpretation  of  the  model,  and  of  the  effects  of monetary 
policy, GK emphasize  the behavior of the markup of price over marginal 
cost.  Together with  nominal  rigidities,  shocks  lead to deviations  of the 
markup from its steady-state  value; one can think in turn of undesirable 
fluctuations  as coming  from these  induced  shifts  in the  markup.  This 
gives  GK a simple way of thinking about optimal policy: by analogy with 
the first best  where  the markup is identically  equal to one,  an optimal 
policy is one which  keeps  the markup constant. 
The focus  on the markup and on stabilizing the markup is appealing. 
But it is misleading.  It is appropriate only in a model in which firms face Comment  291 
the right marginal  cost, thus in a world where, in particular,  there is no 
nominal wage rigidity. If there is nominal wage rigidity, the marginal 
cost faced by the firm does not vary enough, and it is then optimal to 
destabilize the markup. The issue does not arise in the GK model, be- 
cause it ignores wage rigidities. But, in the real world, nominal wage 
rigidities  are important.  After  all, most wages are set for a year;  very few 
prices are. (I am aware that interactions between price decisions can 
magnify individual price rigidities.  But this does not make wage rigidity 
go away.) 
4.  Inflation  Targeting 
GK strongly endorse inflation targeting. It may not be always optimal, 
they argue, but it typically does quite well. The intuition behind the 
proposition is straightforward:  movements in the markup come from 
discrepancies  between expected and actual price levels. Make the price 
level predictable,  and you get rid of markup  fluctuations. 
It would be nice if this conclusion were robust. Unfortunately,  it is 
not-precisely  for the same reasons that the emphasis on the markup  is 
not. The conclusion depends on the details of price and wage rigidity. 
An example will help here. It is in the Fischer  tradition,  short of explicit 
micro  foundations and explicit  intertemporal  optimization.  But these are 
not needed for the points I want to make. 
Ignore nominal rigidities  for the moment, and assume that production 
and price setting are given by 
y  =  cn  +  dx, 
p =  w  +  an  -x, 
where y, n, p, w are log production,  log employment, log price  level, and 
log wage respectively, and x is a supply shock, favorable  if positive, 
adverse if negative. Under decreasing  returns  to labor,  c is less than one, 
and a is positive. Depending on the nature  of the supply shock, d may be 
positive or equal to zero (d is zero if, for example, output is a function of 
a composite input, which is itself Leontief in labor and energy, and 
supply shocks are changes in the price of energy.) All constant terms 
have been omitted for convenience. 
The wage set in labor  markets  and the aggregate  demand for goods are 
in turn given by 
w  =  p +  bn, 
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where  m is the log of the nominal  money  stock. The wage  depends  on 
the price level and employment.  The demand  for goods  depends  on real 
money  balances. 
Absent  nominal  rigidities,  employment  and  the  real wage  would  be 
given  by 
x  b 
n* =  ,  (w -  )* =  x. 
a+b  a+b 
An adverse  supply  shock would  lead to lower employment  and a lower 
real wage. 
Now  introduce  nominal  rigidities.  In the spirit of GK, but without  the 
dynamic  complications,  assume  that the price level is given  by 
p =  OEp  +  (1 -  0)(w + an -  x). 
The  coefficient  0 measures  the  degree  of  predetermination  and  is be- 
tween  zero and one.  E denotes  the expectation  of a variable held before 
the current realization  of both money,  m, and productivity, x. Thus,  the 
price level  depends  partly on the expected  price level,  and partly on the 
actual wage,  employment,  and supply  shock. 
Assume  for notational  convenience  that Em =  Ex =  0, so that, under 
rational expectations,  Ep = 0. Then, the price level is given by 
p =  (1 -  0)(w + an -  x). 
Replacing  the wage  by its value  from the wage  equation and reorganiz- 
ing gives 
ep = (1 -  0)[(a  + b)n -  x]. 
The optimal  monetary  policy  is that policy which-replicates  the level  of 
employment  absent  nominal  rigidities and thus replicates n*. Replacing 
n by  n* in  the  previous  equation  gives  the  implied  value  of  the  price 
level.  Using  the  aggregate  demand  equation  gives  the nominal  money 
stock which  supports  that price level: 
p=  ,  m=  (  b+d)x. Comment  - 293 
These  are the results  emphasized  by GK: The optimal monetary  policy 
must  be  such  as to leave  the price level  unchanged,  and thus  equal to 
what  was  expected.  This insures  the  right markup and  thus  the  right 
level  of employment  and  output.  To achieve  such  an unchanged  price 
level in turn requires monetary  policy to be contractionary in the face of 
an adverse  supply  shock (a negative  value of x). 
Suppose  however  that the source of rigidities is wage  rigidity, so that 
the nominal wage  is given by 
w =  Ep + bEn. 
The wage  is set before the realization of either the price level or employ- 
ment.  Assume  again that Em =  Ex =  0, so that in turn Ep =  En =  0. It 
follows  that the price is given by p = an -  x. To achieve the right level of 
employment  now  requires 
b  c-b  \ 
p=  -  x,  m=  -  +d  x. 
a+b  a+b b 
So, now, in response  to an adverse supply  shock, the right policy is to let 
the  price  level  increase. Depending  on  the  sign  of  the  expression  in 
parentheses-an  expression  that can easily be positive or negative-this 
may imply an increase or a decrease in nominal money. 
One can easily  think of other cases.  For example,  the price level may 
be given  by 
p =  Ew + aEn -  x. 
Interpreting x as a change  in the price of oil, for example,  this specifica- 
tion may capture the idea that while the price of finished goods  is prede- 
termined,  the price of oil is passed  on directly to consumers  and is thus 
reflected one for one in the CPI. In that case, the price level changes by x, 
and there is nothing  the monetary  authority can do about it within  the 
period. 
One could  go on and list other cases,  more realistic dynamics,  and so 
on.  But the point  is made.  When thinking  about optimal monetary pol- 
icy, the details of price and wage  setting matter. Inflation targeting is no 
more a magic solution  than constant  M1 or other popular policies  were 
in the past. 294 *  DISCUSSION 
Discussion 
Robert Hall began the discussion  by questioning  the paper's reliance on a 
Calvo-type  pricing rule, which  he characterized as arbitrary and lacking 
in micro foundations.  He also argued that price stickiness is not necessar- 
ily the best approach to generating real effects of monetary disturbances. 
Greg  Mankiw  defended  the  usefulness  of  sticky-price  models,  citing 
work by Andrew  Caplin and John Leahy, among others,  as demonstrat- 
ing  the  plausibility  of  this  channel.  Hall  also  expressed  doubts  as  to 
whether  the paper's heavy  emphasis  on imperfect competition  is appro- 
priate, given  that we lack evidence  for the degree  of imperfect competi- 
tion necessary  for the NNS  model  to generate  realistic results.  Susanto 
Basu suggested  that a high degree  of imperfect competition  per se is not 
critical, as long as parameter values  are such to permit sufficient cyclical 
variation in the markup. 
Mark Bils  inquired  about  the  magnitude  of  the  markup  needed  in 
order to generate  the  comovement  of hours  and output  highlighted  in 
the  paper.  He  also  expressed  concerns  about the  paper's  emphasis  on 
the extensive  margin (i.e.,  variations in the number of workers) to get a 
high  aggregate  labor supply  elasticity. While the paper is correct in that 
most  movements  in  hours  are due  to  changes  in  employment  rather 
than weekly  hours,  Bils suggested,  it neglects  the fact that much of the 
variability in employment  is due to variations in weeks  worked per year, 
as opposed  to movements  of individuals  into and out of the labor force. 
Thus  the  distinction  that  the  authors  want  to  draw  may  be  less  than 
clear. Further, Bils pointed  out,  many micro studies  from which  models 
in this and  other papers  are calibrated allow  for both types  of employ- 
ment variations.  King responded  that he and Goodfriend had in mind a 
model  similar  to  that  of  Bils with  Cho,  which  combines  an  extensive 
margin and variable capacity utilization; King stated that in this sort of 
setting,  with  reasonable  parameters one could obtain the sort of results 
found  in their paper. 
Bils  also  asked  why  the  positive  correlation  between  consumption 
and wages  was  not  given  more attention  in the paper; did the authors 
want,  perhaps,  to argue for a nonallocative  role for wages?  Chris Car- 
roll followed  up by suggesting  that one  way  of generating  the positive 
consumption-wage  correlation is to introduce  uncertainty into the con- 
sumption  decision;  in the absence of complete  income insurance,  uncer- 
tainty  can generate  reasonably  large marginal propensities  to consume 
out  of  transitory  income,  including  wage  income.  On  a related  issue, 
Carroll also  pointed  out that the ability of monetary  policy to generate Discussion 295 
greater uncertainty  about employment  prospects  might be an important 
channel  of  monetary-policy  transmission.  Indeed,  one  particular mea- 
sure  of  uncertainty,  unemployment  expectations,  is  important  for the 
dynamics  of  consumption  over  the  business  cycle,  as  documented  in 
Carroll and Dunn's  paper. 
Along  similar lines,  Greg Mankiw  expressed  reservations  about  the 
modeling  of consumption  and investment  in the paper, noting  the em- 
pirical weakness  of the neoclassical  models  and the evidence  of "excess 
sensitivity"  of spending  to current income  or cash flow.  He  suggested 
that liquidity constraints may have an important role in the propagation 
mechanism  and thus  should  be included  in a model  purporting to be a 
synthesis  of recent research. 
Benjamin Friedman took issue with the claims of the New Neoclassical 
Synthesis  for inflation targeting.  He agreed with the comments  made by 
Olivier Blanchard that in the face of supply  shocks,  it is not in general 
correct that holding  inflation or the price level steady is the right policy. 
Moreover,  he  questioned  whether  there  is  in  fact  a  consensus  that 
central-bank credibility is important  in practice. He  suggested  that the 
experiences  of countries with and without  inflation-targeting regimes,  as 
well  as work  by Larry Ball on  the determinants  of sacrifice ratios,  give 
little support to the idea that credibility effects are important. Goodfriend 
agreed that evidence  that credibility matters is hard to come by. In particu- 
lar,  he  noted  that  an  identification  problem  arises  because  countries 
which adopt inflation targets are often those that have experienced credi- 
bility  problems  in the  past.  He  suggested  that one  can see  casual  evi- 
dence  that credibility  matters by looking  at the behavior  of long  bond 
rates  in  countries  adopting  more  inflation-focused  strategies.  Torsten 
Persson  noted  that Europe's  recent  experience  of speculative  currency 
attacks,  which  presumably  derived  from  concerns  about  the  commit- 
ment  of policymakers  to their announced  goals,  is consistent  with  the 
view  that credibility is important. 